The main object of the group is to promote closer relations between the European and Atlantic countries by providing a regular forum in Britain for informed discussion of their problems and possibilities for better economic and political co-operation with each other and with the rest of the world.

On this occasion, His Excellency Mr Özdem Sanberk was invited to give a talk on some of the key features of Turkish foreign policy on March 15, 1999. These include:

• The current position of Turkey
• Turkey and the EU
• Turkish-Greek relations
• Cyprus
• The PKK

The talk is followed by a question and answer session relating to both the talk and to current issues of interest regarding Turkey.

Introduction

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to be with you this evening as your guest speaker here at the European-Atlantic Group, in these splendid surroundings of the St. Ermin's Hotel. It is through bodies like this Group that the countries of the western alliance share their ideas and carry forward the common spirit which has existed between them for the last half century. So I very much appreciate this opportunity to talk about Turkey's view on the issues which concern you.

It is late in the day, we have had an excellent dinner, and so I want to keep these opening remarks as short as I can.

What I would like to do this evening is to review some of the key features of Turkish foreign policy, including our relations with the rest of Europe. Naturally this includes also recent events following the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan. Of course I shall also talk about our relations with Greece. I know that there is a whole list of topics which you would like me to discuss: Cyprus, the Aegean, human rights, the PKK and the Kurdish problem.

This is a long list and if I went into detail on all of them, we would never be able to leave this beautiful hotel this evening. But I will try and touch on some of them briefly in my address, then I shall be happy to take all your questions on all these topics, and any others you may have, afterwards. I will not pretend to have the answers to all your questions or to have an exclusive monopoly of the truth. I would not presume to claim that I am right and everyone else is therefore wrong. As a wise Frenchman said, 'Avoir toujours raison, c'est le plus grand tort.' I will simply give you the Turkish perspective and the facts as we see them. I am not seeking to convert or to convince you. I would just like you to look at the other side of the story, for every story has another side.

Turkey's location and economic situation

First, a little scene-setting. Let me remind you of a few facts. The basic geographical fact about Turkey is that it lies not at the heart of Europe but on its eastern periphery. Unlike Britain we do not lie on the edge of a great ocean but close to the intersection of continents and near the centre of the great Eurasian land mass. As a result of the collapse of Communism we find ourselves for the first time for seventy years at the epicentre of a new emerging political and economic reality, which in Turkey we call 'Eurasia' - the belt of countries from the Balkans to the edge of China.

But from the dawn of history, Turkey has always been deeply involved in the life of Europe. We have a multiple cultural heritage and in some ways a multiple identity, but our situation is not so different from that of other European countries which for reasons of history, geography, and trade look to the world from more than one direction. Perhaps Spain with its links with other Spanish-speaking countries and Britain and the Anglo-Saxon world and the British Commonwealth are parallels. For Spain and Britain, links with their sister countries do not conflict with their European vocation. The same is true for us in Turkey.

Turkey's identity

As individuals, identity cannot be summed up in one word. It is the same for our nation's identity. We certainly do not have, as outsiders sometimes claim, an identity crisis. Turkey and the Turks are very conscious of their identity and heritage. Ordinary people in Turkey do not see themselves as a living in a land torn between east and west. They relish variety and they see their country as a land enriched by a multiple heritage.

We regard ourselves as we have always done, whether under the Republic or in Ottoman times, as part and parcel of Europe. Currently our role there is growing again, following the opening up of our economy in the 1980's.

Turkey is a large country of sixty-five million people. Istanbul, a city of twelve million people, is Europe's largest city. We are Britain's largest trading partner in the entire arc of countries between Austria and Morocco, including the countries of the Arab Middle East. We are about the sixth to eighth largest external trading partner of the European Union, and since 1996, we have had a full customs union with it.

A generation ago Turkey was an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Today we are an industrial one with average economic growth of six or seven percent a year over the last three decades. The balance in the country has shifted to the towns and in particular to the large towns. One sign of this is that we now have over 20 national satellite TV channels, 300 local TV channels and 1000 local private radios.

This process is happening very fast. The speed of transformation raises two further issues. One is internal. When a society moves towards becoming an advanced industrial economy as fast as Turkey does, there is always a price to be paid. The social costs can be high. Institutions, laws, rules, often lag behind the level of development of the country as a whole. Many of our legal arrangements were made several generations ago for a traditional Mediterranean agricultural society. They basically derive from the Napoleonic Code.

Since then the world has moved on and so has Turkish society. Other countries, including those in the Iberian peninsula, have gone through a parallel legal administrative revolution in the course of their journey into Europe, moving away from a highly prefectorial and essentially Napoleonic system designed to regulate an agrarian society. We are making our transition in a part of the world where the nation-state is a more recent arrival on the scene. We remain conscious of the potential for disruption, shown for instance last weekend in the dreadful terrorist incident in Istanbul in which 13 innocent people were killed. A strong section of Turkish public opinion wants to put law and order, security and the integrity of the country first. Can you blame them? That is why although changes are being made, they do not always happen at the speed which everyone would wish.

The area surrounding Turkey

Turkey has a multi-party democracy where democracies are thin on the ground. We are doing this in a region of great turbulence and political conflict where both industrialisation and multiparty democracy are newcomers to the scene. Turkey has eight neighbouring states (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Greece.) Other than the countries of Iran and the Caucasus, these are all former parts of the Ottoman Empire which achieved nationhood by breaking away from us. In most of these countries there are strong irredentist currents, people who dream, perhaps only half-seriously, of taking land from Turkey.

For the last three quarters of a century, Turkey has applied what it thinks is the answer to its internal and external challenges: the creation of a post-imperial nation state, stable, with a modern European industrial democracy at the far end of our continent. We believe that we have come a long way in this endeavour.

In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has systematically tried to extend this model of democratic political stability, international cooperation, and economic prosperity to the region around us. Turkey became an economic focal point in the region. This thinking lies behind the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, as well as behind the formidable volume of our trade with the Russian Federation, the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and our joint energy projects, oil and gas pipeline and also behind our support for the Middle East Peace Initiative. But we recognize that this is the essential, but not central, story. The central story - the one which will confirm the success of our endeavours - lies in our relations with the countries to our west and northwest. That is why since the early 1960's we have been working for EU membership.

Europe's reaction to Turkey's drive for EU membership

Europe has rolled its psychological frontiers eastwards for other countries. The effects have invariably been beneficial for both sides. Yet Turkey's application has not received that response. At the moment we are being downgraded into a 'proximity zone' country, even though we have a full working customs union with the EU and a huge trade volume, not to mention 3 million Turks as future EU citizens living in different EU membership countries at present. This is surprising for several reasons. Turkey has many things to offer Europe.

What Turkey can offer Europe

• First there is a genuine community of economic and political interest between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is an essential strategic partner of Europe. Try and imagine the Near East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Caucasus without the Turkish component in the Atlantic/European Partnership.
• Second Turkey is genuinely part of Europe's common culture and heritage. Go to Turkey and you will find your origins (from Gordion knot to cynic philosophers, from early Christians in Cappadocia to Sixth Council in Nicea, you are in a European cultural heritage)
• Third, our economy is increasingly our main asset. We still have some way to go in reducing the percentage of the population in farming and in overcoming regional income differences, and in bringing down prices. But many bankers and businessmen will tell you that Turkey is already the largest and strongest economy at the eastern corner of Europe. Our role is set to grow.
• Fourth, Turkey is the regional pivot for southern Europe. Istanbul is the main trade centre of the area and may well become its main financial centre too. There is real complementarity between ourselves and the other eastern Europeans.
• Fifth, Turkish society is young and dynamic. It is extremely energetic and adaptable. We are a society which has come a long way, is still moving fast, and can be confident about its future.

I wonder if any other applicant country has been able to make a similar detailed case about what it has to offer Europe. In many cases the arguments have simply been about ties of historic sentiment and the moral obligation of more advanced western European countries to help less fortunate ones, politically and economically. I do not think that is wrong. But I do feel that after all these years Turkey should not have to press its case harder than anyone else and that it is at least as entitled to political and moral support as the other applicants.

What are the sources of European resistance to Turkey's application?

Why do we not obtain this support? Well, perhaps Turkey can blamed itself for not interfacing well with European institutions and not always going about things in the right way. We are a large country and incorporating us into Europe is going to be an immense task. But we have been leapfrogged in the queue for membership by countries with weaker democratic institutions and much weaker economies than ours.

I would ask you to look at the diverse coalition of our critics and opponents inside the European Union. I believe that where Turkey is concerned, the EU is in danger of allowing itself to be drawn into the ethnic and cultural disputes of the eastern Mediterranean. Those criticisms of Turkey's human rights record, for example, some times are very hard to distinguish from ethnic grudges. And behind those ethnic grudges lurk irredentist dreams which ought to have no place in the modern European scene.

The shift in European attitudes seems to go back to the accession of Greece in 1981 and Greece's decision to use its membership of the EU as its main weapon in the international arena against Turkey. Europe has repeatedly turned a blind eye. First when all financial cooperation with Turkey was blocked. (Latterly there have been moves to reverse this, albeit unsuccessfully, but only after eighteen years.) Then when the Turkey/EU Association institutions were paralysed. Most recently it has had nothing to say about the flagrant involvement of the Greek authorities with PKK terrorism and their help to a wanted criminal on the run.

Let me, by the way, tell you that my criticisms of Greece are aimed at hard-liners. I still believe that there are moderates, or people with common sense, in Athens who believe in compromise and coexistence and the brotherhood of the Greek and Turkish peoples. I regard them as friends and allies and I hope that eventually they will prevail. If they do, it will not only be Greece and Turkey which benefit but the whole of the EU.

But until they do, I fear we shall see continuous attempts to polarise Europe against Turkey and to get direct European backing for Greece especially over Cyprus. If the Greek Cypriots succeed in achieving full membership without a genuine inter-communal settlement on the island, then things could become even more unstable. Then Europe would have imported an ethnic conflict into its body politics, which would drive a deep and permanent wedge between Turkey and Europe.

The only way to a stable settlement on Cyprus is for a free working arrangement between the two communities on an equal basis and on a bi-zonal frame, something which was envisaged in the original 1960 Independence Constitution. The recent proposal of President Denktash, a confederation of two sovereign states, is a chance for all of us. These are realistic proposals to cope with a very complex problem. They deserve careful consideration. Turkey is still on a gradualist path towards possible 'virtual membership'

Since Luxembourg, the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU has been in abeyance. But our aim is still to create deep and lasting economic, political, and social convergence between Turkey and Europe through a gradualist and incremental approach. We in Turkey will have to do a great deal of home work in areas such as bringing our legal and political freedoms fully into line with European standards; modernizing our economy; and overhauling our administrative system. Perhaps in doing so we shall achieve the substance of EU membership without the formal title: what some people call 'virtual EU membership'.

That sounds like a happy ending. And I hope that it takes place. But you have to remember that the people of Turkey look at the EU now as a club which has rejected them. That is not a healthy basis for a good long term relation. What is more, relations are complicated by other disputes where we feel that Europe is on the wrong side, and indeed is even striking at our legitimate interests and even our sovereignty. These feelings have grown stronger in the last few months as a result of the Öcalan affair.

The PKK and the Kurds

In this context let me turn now to the question of the southeast Turkey, the PKK, and the Kurds. This is an enormous topic. I can make only a few points.

• The first is that the PKK is an ethno-centre Marxist, Leninist violent revolutionary movement. It has no representation among the Kurds. In the last election, the party who proposed an alternative identity and openly supported secession, received only one-seventh of the votes from Turkish citizens of Kurdish origins. The remainder voted for other parties.
• The second is that this is not an apartheid or 'colonial type' situation, as some quarters want to portray it. That is the impression often given by the British media recently and it is misleading. If you are a person of Kurdish stock in Turkey, you have exactly the same rights and opportunities as a citizen as anyone else. That is not a polite fiction or a theory. It is a fact. In Turkey, everyone has a vote: one man, one vote. Many of the most famous and powerful people in Turkey are of Kurdish stock. What you do not have is the right to secession or to advocate secession. That may seem strange in Britain, but in fact most European countries and North American ones do not tolerate secession. International Law forbids any action, even peaceful action, which would impair the territorial integrity and political unity of a country. But in any case, another point, which Europe tends to ignore, is that only a one in three minority of Turkey's ethnic Kurds live in the southeast. The rest is all over the country. Istanbul is the largest Kurdish city.
• This is a problem with a strong external dimension. There are two aspects to this external dimension. One of them is the role of some of our immediate neighbours in the eastern Mediterranean. We have been saying for many years that the so-called Kurdish problem was deliberately fanned by some of our neighbours. Without Syrian support, the PKK could never have got started or survived as a terrorist organisation. Worse still, I fear that it also relied on support from our NATO ally Greece. The support that members of the Greek cabinet gave to Öcalan is line with over a decade of quiet support for the PKK. It operated three camps in Greece. It infiltrated terrorists into Turkey from Greece. We caught some of them in 1994. Last year the PKK actually opened a representative office in Greece. One might go beyond that to ask how the PKK can find the $20 or 30 million dollars its needs to operate an international television station, a question which has never been satisfactorily answered.
• The second external aspect lies in western Europe where a climate of extremism has been allowed to develop among several hundred thousand emigrants, causing them to reject their country of origin and follow a radical and implacable ideology. [If you arrive in London as a worker from Turkey, you will quickly be asked if you are Turkish or Kurdish. If you say you are Kurdish, you will find all sorts of special activities and organisations are available to you. The result is that] a pool of radical militants has been created in several countries which no longer has links with Turkey. Media coverage of the asylum issue has attracted a steady stream of new immigrants and asylum seekers. Inside immigrant communities, the PKK plays a powerful and sometimes violent role. [In London for example, much of the Turkish community lives under its shadow and suffers from crimes such as extortion.] I think that western societies have created a serious long-term problem for themselves, not for Turkey in allowing this culture of extremism to grow on their soil.
• Inside Turkey, the picture is very different. Yes certainly, there are tensions and serious challenges to be put right in southeastern Turkey. Many of these problems are economic. This is one of our poorest regions and it has been hard hit by the embargo against Iraq. After a decade and a half of struggling against cruel and vicious terrorism, life in the south east is definitely returning to normal as far as law and order are concerned. The overwhelming majority of people, and those of Kurdish stock are just like anyone else, are very angry at the brutality of the PKK and the enormous death toll it has claimed, most of its victims being ethnic Kurds. They know that their future lies as full citizens of a strong, pluralist and prosperous Turkey.
• Since the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK has sworn all out war against Turkey. These are behind the bombing incidents in the last few days. But basically it knows that it has no future in Turkey. Unpleasant as these attacks are, there is no doubt that they will be defeated. The PKK's only hope is to use its friends in Europe to put pressure on Turkey and internationalise the problem.
• Europe has to consider its position very carefully. If Turkey, like Spain, is allowed to progress towards full integration with the rest of Europe, I think we shall see this issue evolve in a democratic framework and hopefully resolve itself in time. Isolating and pressuring Turkey will reduce the chances of this happening.

Finally, I will touch briefly on the question of political Islam and the role of the Armed Forces. Political Islam in Turkey is not the force which it is in parts of Asia, southeast Asia, the Far East, or in North Africa. In these countries, it draws its support from sections of rural society in the poorer parts of their country and their offshoots in the big cities, and from the worldwide political Islam movements. But Turkey's middle class has grown up in an environment in which religion and personal politics are separate and there is freedom of belief and choice about whether to be pious or not. Many of the 'secularists' are people who actually are quite pious. But they believe in tolerance, as do, I would say, most Turkish Muslims. In Turkey if you say you are an atheist, no one is shocked. It is your private affair.

Political Islam is important in Turkey for two reasons. Because the conventional parties are badly divided, the Islamists (who are very well organised) have been able to exert disproportionate influence with a relatively small block of votes. Because Turkish society is undergoing very rapid transformation, as the population is shifting from village to city, the small block of votes has become an outlet for those who resent the change, but it is still only 1 in 5.

Most people in Turkey are sure that in the long term our future as a secular society is assured. But they strongly dislike the idea of an Islamist government in the short term, especially one that tried to impose its agenda on society. For historical reasons, the bulwark of the middle class against political Islam has always been the armed forces. It is no exaggeration to say that much of Turkish society positively expects the Armed Forces to take the lead in speaking up against political Islam.

There I would like to conclude and invite questions. Turkey is a complex and rapidly changing society. It is a place where the stakes are high. If newspapers are anything to go by, Turkey is very poorly understood in western Europe. But Turkey is a democratic society and a strong one. It is becoming stronger and more prosperous with each year that passes. Those who are trying to alienate Europe from Turkey are not serving Europe's interests. They are damaging them. I think we all need to think carefully about ways of renewing and revitalising the Turkish European relationship in the interests of both sides. The problems are political and they are unnecessary and I hope that they will prove only temporary.

In the longer term, Turkey has always been part of the European system and I believe that our interdependency will constantly reassert itself. Both Turkey and the EU may need to rediscover that lesson.

Discussion following the Ambassadors talk at the

European Atlantic Group

There are many points in what the Ambassador has said which one could follow. I would like to say myself, as one who has been in Turkey and who has seen the links between Turkey and Europe and the mutual effect it has had, how much I agree with his conclusion. There are so many points so I will single out one which I might ask him. It arises from his references to the Kurds.

In the Financial Times about two weeks ago, I noticed a report of a conversation which the journalist had had with a prominent Kurdish businessman in Diyarbakir in which the businessman, Mr Can, remarked that there were, as the Ambassador said, many moderate Kurds who do not support the PKK. But he went on to say, "Children should have the chance to learn to read and watch television in Kurdish, this would not split up the state, on the contrary, we love our country and want it to stay united but Kurds should live with their own culture and language and I hope that the necessary regulations should be adopted soon." In the past decade or so at one time or another, I think particularly in the time of Prime Minister and President Özal, this perhaps reflected some perspective on Turkish government policy. Can I ask the Ambassador whether there is a possibility of some move in this direction in current circumstances?

You have raised a very important question actually. It has two aspects. One is relating to the Kurdish language, teaching and learning the language, and the other, of course, is the broadcasting. I will start with the last one. In Turkey today you can find CDs, Kurdish papers, Kurdish songs in the Kurdish language. This is widely known but what is not known very much is the fact that there is also Kurdish broadcasting in Turkey and it started in May 1996. There were two Kurdish private TV broadcasting bases in Diyarbakir - one was Söz TV and the other was Can TV. In June 1996 they were attacked by the PKK, and seven people, one pregnant woman, were assassinated because the broadcasting was not in the line of the PKK. Today in Turkey you can find around 20 private Kurdish radio and TV broadcasting channels and the most recent one is K TV which was also very recently acknowledged in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Communications.

When it comes to language you just have to go to Diyarbakir or anywhere and you will hear Kurdish, also in Istanbul. But let us not forget that Turkey has an official language which is Turkish. The learning of a foreign language in Turkey is an individual choice. This is not a matter for the state as far as we are concerned at the moment. We do not spend money from our budget to teach people local Turkish languages in Anatolia and at the moment, I emphasise 'at the moment', allow citizens to organise themselves and to learn Kurdish. Perhaps it will come but it cannot come under restrain and the pressure of a group resorting to bloodshed and putting pressure on the government to do this. I think everything is possible if there is an atmosphere of mutual understanding and especially the stopping of the bloodshed.

Turkey has made an invaluable contribution to NATO since it became a member. It has been very central to NATO's policy during the Cold War. Its bases and its outposts are critical even today. Its forces, not very much discussed, which operate in Bosnia, are a very critical factor to the stability and confidence which it gives the people there. Indeed, it plays a broader role when it comes to the politics between Iraq, Israel and both of their neighbours, despite its membership of NATO. All of these factors notwithstanding, Turkey is, if I can put it bluntly, slapped in the face forever when it comes to the EU. You have mentioned already that Hungary's GDP is smaller than that of Turkey - that is accepted. When you hear that countries like Slovenia, for example, are given assistance with regard to how they can fast track full membership to the EU, does there not come a point where Turkey says to itself, "We have one foot in the west, we have one foot in the east, we are already in the process of establishing a zone of economic cooperation and stability with newly emerging former states of the Soviet Union and countries to the east". Turkey has a long and proud history. Does there not come a point where Turkey decides that it is time to assume its own destiny independent of Europe?

You have raised very important questions and it goes to the hearts of many Turks. Definitely in Turkey at many levels there is a great sense of injustice, frustration even exasperation, but nevertheless one of the characteristics of Turkish foreign policy is its consistency, responsibility and reliability. We believe that Turkey's destiny is very closely linked to that of Europe and we also believe that European destiny is very closely linked to that of Turkey. I do not think that we have to commit the same error because the Europeans have the political advantage and this is the reason why Turkey does not think that we have to come out with threats and alternatives to Turkey's allies and partners in Europe. I believe that the day will come when the European partners and the rest of the western world will understand the way in which they treat Turkey. It is something against their own interests as well.

Turkey is definitely very happy to see countries like Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, let alone the three new members of NATO, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and we believe that their participation in the European Union will be a guarantee in Europe for the future prosperity and stability of Europe. If there is stability in Europe, there will be stability in Turkey. If there is prosperity in Europe, Turkey will have part of this prosperity. These are, of course, nice words but there is definitely a sense of revolt in many quarters in Turkey and these feelings of being rejected are very much felt in each and every member of our society.

Three questions if I may. You did say that Turkey has not got any territorial claims against any of its neighbours and you refer especially to Greece, you did not refer to Cyprus, but the first question is how do you reconcile this statement with the fact that 35,000 troops are in the northern part of Cyprus with more than enough who happens to support it?

The second question. You refer to the possibility of a solution. You have confused me a bit there. You did point out that the framework of the Zurich-London Agreements offers a possibility and, of course, the Zurich-London Agreements provide for one state, and then you went on to say that the proposal by Mr Denktash for a confederation could be a solution. Now how do you reconcile the two? And, by the way, Turkey is a signatory of the Zurich-London Agreements which provide for one state. In fact, it is one of the three guarantors. How do you reconcile that fact with a new stand taken by Ankara supporting the Denktash proposal for a confederation?

And the third one. Do you see any possibility at all after the elections in Turkey an effort to break this deadlock on the basis of the Agreements which constitute the basis of the talks signed by Mr Denktash. We had two leaders sign that Agreement, the late Makarios and Mr Kyprianou. On the other side we had only one person, Mr Denktash who signed for the Agreements which provide the same principles. And, of course, on the basis of the solutions, which are supported by Britain, the United States and the European Union, is there any possibility of Turkey really leaving that isolation in which she finds herself now, and really come out to meet the other side on the basis of Agreements accepted earlier on by both sides?

First, let us start with Cyprus. Turkey, of course, did not cause the Cyprus crisis. It was caused by the breakdown of the London-Zurich Agreements and by the almost entire massacre of the Turkish population on the island. And, of course, what we see as far as this problem is concerned is a total reluctance and rejection from Greek Cypriots and also from the Greek mainland. But of all the proposals so far, it was not President Denktash, who rejected the United Nations Secretary-General's framework agreement in the 1980s, it was not President Denktash who rejected the Set of Ideas of the Secretary-General in the early 1990s, and it was not President Denktash who rejected the confidence building measures. So we all know that when we previously talk of these questions, I have always made this point very clear. So one must wait for when and if the Greek Cypriots openly and outspokenly send signals to the Turkish Cypriots that they are ready to share their destiny with their Turkish Cypriot islanders, and they are ready to share their future together on the same island, instead of trying to impose embargoes inhuman boycotts, instead of forcing the Green Line (the buffer zone), instead of infringing the sanctity of the United Nations separation lines, and instead of arming themselves by buying tanks and all kinds of weapons in a frenzied way, and, though it is now resolved, with the S-300 missiles. Why? The Turkish army or Turkey has never shown the slightest disposition to engage in any kind of offensive operation in Cyprus for the last 25 years. This is the reason why we must have a change of mind. This is my message to you. This is message is to Greece and the Greek Cypriots.

Now I come to your question whether Greece has some territorial design on Turkey. Yes they have. After the election in May the Archbishop of Greece, the top Office of the Greek Church, Archbishop Christopholou said that Trabzon must be returned to Greece and he called for the recapture of Constantinople and Ayasophia from Turkey. And how can you expect that the Turks have any sort of confidence in our Greek friends, not to mention, of course, their recent help to the PKK and Öcalan being supported by Greece, I don't mention all these. But we must exert efforts, we must try to stop fighting wars of thousands of years ago, we have to live together in a region, we have to share the same destiny. This is my message to you. Thank you.

Ambassador, as you have pointed out, Turkey has been the target of terrible acts of terrorism during the last couple of weeks, since the capture of Öcalan. We only heard about the last one in which, unfortunately, thirteen young sales girls died. But of course during the last couple of weeks, every day, at least two people were getting killed, around the city of Istanbul especially. Do you think these terrible acts are fueled by the encouragement the PKK gets from some groups in the western world?

My own remark would be that this is very obvious. When these acts are reported and repeated constantly and highlighted by the media, by televisions, by all kinds of written press or radios, of course this is in this country, what a wise politician called "oxygen for terrorist". The more they are reported, the more they are highlighted, the more they are praised. We will, unfortunately, never by able to wipe out the scourge of terrorism. If we are complacent we will always have to submit ourselves to their threats. If we have the determination to fight against terrorism, I think, perhaps one day, we will wipe the scourge of terrorism. My message, perhaps, this evening is that terrorism cannot be defined by the cause but by the act. And it is valid for all of us and all western societies. If we are complacent against terrorism we will have to suffer. Thank you.

May I congratulate you on your hard hitting and very frank speech. Your Excellency, it is rather odd that Turkey is not in the European Union and the United Kingdom is, because at least part of Turkey is actually in Europe whereas the United Kingdom is not in Europe at all. When we exert control over our destiny and pull out of the European Union, which I am sure we will, Your Excellency, would you not think it a marvellous idea that when we are out of the European Union, we have a free trade agreement with Turkey to build up and strengthen the trading relationship we have and strengthen the ties of friendship between our two great countries.

Well, let me just make one remark. After the conclusion of the Customs Union our trade volume between Turkey and Britain has shown a spectacular increase. Now I think we have ú3 billion of both-way trades and I think it is greatly thanks to the Customs Union and for which we are very happy, of course.

While appreciating enormously what the Ambassador has said, I would just like to ask him a question and if necessary off the record. When, while Turkey is a very loyal member of NATO and a very much appreciated one - we all know with her strategic position, her army and all her strength and power in the Near East - why is it that the European Union should take so long and, indeed, should refuse at present to permit Turkey to become a member? The reason I understand, and I would like to be corrected if I am wrong, is because of human rights. What exactly do they mean by human rights? Or what, in other words, does the Ambassador think Turkey needs to do to put itself in the position to be accepted by the European Union as it is accepted by NATO?

Thank you very much indeed. I am very happy that you have asked me this question. The human rights issue is sacred. I do not think that any country is in any position to claim that it has come to a stage that it has no human rights violations. But the importance is whether there are means to redress these violations. In Turkey there are definitely human rights violations. This is the reason why we are a party to the Convention of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and we have accepted all its internal and external mechanisms. But, this is a very important point. When there is a human rights violation in Turkey as in Britain, there is a possibility for the party whose interests are damaged and cannot be redressed by the internal mechanism, to resort to the European Council Human Rights Courts. And the Courts decisions are binding for Turkey. Turkey is one of the countries, perhaps after Italy or after Britain, which has been most condemned or found guilty and we have complied with the courts decision. I do not know how many thousands, hundreds or millions of Turkish Liras, but we have paid a lot of money as compensation. Things may definitely go wrong in Turkey like in any other country, but the human rights issue cannot be or must not be used as a political alibi or pretext to isolate a country like Turkey.

I have to be honest with you. I have a house in Turkey, which I have had for over ten years, and I have visited the country more than a hundred times. I also have accommodation in Greece and I have visited that country almost as many times. When I talk to my Turkish friends about Greece they shrug their shoulders in a sort of indifferent way and say they are not very worried about the Greeks. The Greeks can do what they like but the Turks do not really care. When I talk to the Greeks I find a great deal of hatred which seems to be inculcated into the youngsters from an early age and it is the basis of a prejudice which lives with them for the rest of their lives. I find this very widespread because I have travelled all over Greece. And, much as I try to educate them, it is very difficult to do so. They are very well aware of the history between Greece and Turkey going back over two thousand years at least. On the other hand, I have travelled very widely round the world. I worked in Washington D.C. for four years, I have visited sixty or seventy countries for long periods of time and I find when I travel round the world that there is a lot of Greek propaganda. The Greek propaganda machine is well established and well financed. When I look for a Turkish propaganda machine, I do not find any. You yourself have very eloquently put the case for Turkey but the publicity, with all respect Ambassador, which your speech will attract in this country, will not be very large. Had it been the Greek Ambassador, I expect it would have been plastered all over the newspapers. What I would like to ask you is what more can Turkey do to establish a very good propaganda machine and sell her case, which is a very good sound case, to the rest of the world? I think unless many people in many other countries believe in Turkey and the Turkish situation, Turkey will always suffer adversely.

Thank you very much. I can but concur with you with all my heart. It is true that if you read Turkish papers, in those days we talked a lot about our Greek friends, generally you do not find so many Greek issues. If you are a Turk living in Athens, you see there is not a day without an insult to Turks. It is very interesting. Greece has tried to invade Turkey twice this century but Turkey has never tried to invade Greece. But during the second invasion attempt in the 1920s, the Greeks had to leave Anatolia. In our schoolbooks you will not see that the Turks threw out the Greeks. We talk about Turks who have thrown out the enemy. We do not want to name Greeks because one of the achievements of Atatürk is something very important and that is that the Turks do not have a negative identity. Greeks are not enemies for us. It is not for us to find our national identity as opposed to the Greeks. We do not define ourselves as against the Greeks or against the French or against the British or Germans. Our only enemy, according to Atatürk's thinking, is fanaticism and ignorance. This is the reason why we have an advantage over Greece because for us the enemy is not the other. It is not another nation. We believe that the day will come that our Greek friends will really stop the fighting the wars of centuries and thousands of years. This is serious because it was stated by the Archbishop of Athens. There are no sensible Greek writers saying that this is wrong and we must not talk like this. Whatever we do, of course, is not enough. We also take our friends for granted. We always think that justice will prevail and that things will not go in the wrong direction.

Mr. Ambassador, will you allow me to go back to Cyprus because I am afraid some of the description you have given as to who accepted the proposals and who did not, somehow leave most of us Cypriots wondering whether we have been reading the same newspapers or following the same political effects. It would seem that the moment we seem to be getting on to the same lines as Mr. Denktash he moves his ground. When we accepted federation, he immediately withdrew the proposals. He rejected the measures which were proposed for coordination. He is the man whose government is stopping the Turkish Cypriots and us from getting together and discussing things. The business people have just been stopped yet again from getting together with their Greek Cypriot compatriots to see if they themselves can find some way in which we can go forward.

You said that Turkey has no territorial demands on anybody, yet after the disastrous coup by the Greek fascists which brought Turkey into the island to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot community, to which a lot of us said, "Well, perhaps they have the right to do this driven by the London-Zurich Agreements." We must remember that those Agreements actually gave Turkey the right to come into the island, if it was justified, to reestablish the Republic of Cyprus. Instead of that, we have seen Turkey there for 25 years with 35,000 troops during which time almost half the Turkish Cypriot population has left the island, and I am using figures published by the Turkish Cypriot press, and during which time over 65,000 Turkish citizens from Turkey have come and taken the homes, not only of the Greek Cypriots, who have been driven out of their homeland, but of the Turkish Cypriots as well. You have spoken of Turkey carrying out the decisions of the Human Rights Court of the European Council.

You have not mentioned the case of Loizidou where Turkey was judged to be the actual controller of events in Cyprus and which has been rejected by Turkey, and not only would they not allow Mrs Loizidou to go back to her home as Turkey would not allow any of us to go back to our homes or even to visit the graves of our parents and our grandparents, but we have to stay refugees in our own island. Surely, Mr. Ambassador, if things were as good as you describe them, we should have no problem in reaching an agreement. Can you tell us what we are doing wrong and how we can make certain that we can reach an agreement and go back to the peaceful existence which we want. I was born in Cyprus and I lived with Turkish Cypriots with whom I continue to have associations here and we live perfectly peacefully in London. Why can we not do the same in Cyprus?

Thank you very much. Well, I advise you a very simple thing. Just remove the unlawful embargo on the Turkish Cypriots. This is the first thing. And do not forget that the past in Cyprus has an important bearing on the present. Turkish Cypriots lived like prisoners and refugees in their own homeland for ten years, 1964 - 1974. And, of course, the Turkish intervention was a response to a Greek Cypriots right-wing coup supported by the military junta in Greece, in Athens, and which then deported the then President Makarios. After having settled some old scores the forces on the island set out systematically to eradicate the Turkish community and this outrage followed a period, ten years, in which Turkish Cypriots were steadily ethnically cleansed by the Greek Cypriots and Nikos Sampson himself was responsible for the deaths of civilians, children, both the Turks and the British.

So, let us not forget the past but let us look at the future in a constructive way. Again, I remember very well because I was working with President Özal at that time, and Özal proposed quadrilateral talks between Turkey, Greece and the two communities on the island under the Secretary-General. It was rejected by the Greek side. It is really so easy to put the blame on the Turkish side but it is better to make some sort of introspection, self-criticism. The Greek Cypriots can show their capacity by taking tangible measures, removing the embargo, for instance, or coming forward in an outspoken way that they are ready to share their destiny with the Turkish Cypriots, but not between closed doors, openly, between the responsible people. Then you will send signals. Turkey has kept its military presence on the island at an absolute minimum necessary to guarantee the physical existence of the Turkish Cypriots there. Turkey has never said that it is going to incorporate part of the island in its territory but Greece has said this. But people say that this is in the past and they are no longer after Enosis. But you have here the Archbishops of Athens who talk about the recapture of Istanbul!

Successive Greek governments have said time and time again that they have no territorial claim to Turkey whatsoever, that they back Turkey's attempt to join the European Union.

Firstly, I would like to say that when you moved here, the then Cyprus High Commissioner said, "We have very bad news", I said, "Why is that?" He said "The new Ambassador of Turkey in this country is a very likable and experienced person and so it means a hell of a lot of harder work for you". I actually do acknowledge that and so do quite a few others because a fair number of your fan club are here. But I would like to go through a few of the items you mentioned for your further comment please.

Statistics are all very nice but you mentioned that there are 1500 radio stations in Turkey out of which 27 of them are Kurdish. I think you also mentioned that there about 12 million Kurds and the proportion of 12 million to 65 million is not correctly reflected by the number of stations. I am not going to dwell on the Cyprus issue, actually, but I think that you pointed out that at this time there is a problem with the Kurdish language. At this time there is a problem with the radio stations. May I then suggest that you recognise that at this time there are certain things that have to be put right. Despite the fact that I personally feel that the European Union decision about Turkey has, if anything, put back progress on the Cyprus issue, I still think you have to recognise certain shortcomings such as this, and of course the undisputed question of military interference in political affairs of Turkey. I will accept the invitation to ask questions very briefly and I would welcome your comments. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. In Turkey we have a rather comfortable position. We do not hide our problems. Turkey is a very transparent country. Perhaps 1100 or 1500 radio stations are not enough. Perhaps 27 private television channels are not enough. But in those television stations and in those radio programmes you definitely hear all these problems mentioned by ourselves so it is not the first time that we hear these problems. Turkish MPs assume their roles of parliamentarians. Turkish journalists assume their roles and scrutinise the government. We have never said that Turkey is a rose garden and no one has claimed anything like this. We are very conscious of our problems but our problems are going to be solved by us, by the Turkish government who is responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It is going to be solved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and it speaks for the progressively painstaking task because we assume our responsibility. We are a transparent society and we may have problems, maybe more than our neighbours but we definitely assume our responsibility and try to solve them. But we expect from our NATO allies, from our partners, the minimum solidarity that we have shown them. Turkey has never failed to be with them when it was needed. It was the same during the Cold War and it was the same during the Gulf War. Turkey has always been there. But we have not seen this in an entirely reciprocated way. Thank you.

Your Excellency, the forthcoming elections next month generally seem to be one of the most important in Turkish history. When you presented the picture of one in five of the Turkish population leading towards radical Islam. Now under the worst case scenario we are actually looking at about 30% of the population. The secular 70% do not seem to have got their act together. There have been numerous scandals and talk now seems to be looking towards the military - are they going to step in? Should that happen? I do not think it is a situation which we should cast aside and say will not happen. All indication seems to show that within five or six months, if the situation does not improve and there is deadlock, that they will get involved. How will you and your fellow ambassadors throughout Europe and throughout the world justify such an intervention?

Well, of course, there is no such intention and I do not think we are in line to discuss hypothetical questions. Do not be so pessimistic about Turkish politics. We Turks are great compromisers. Things seem to go wrong but at the very last moment we find a solution and what you see in Turkey is not turbulence. We have a government crisis but it is a surface froth. There is a very strong underlying current which is always westwards and in line with Turkish constitution. In Turkey we must understand quite well the role of the military. The Turkish military see themselves as custodians of the secular state, the unitary state because they believe in the freedom of religion, the freedom of conscience and the liberty of religion. But they see themselves also as guardians of the constitution. They do not want a change in the constitution, they want to protect the constitution against assaults. And for historical reasons the Turkish military has always played a very prominent role in Turkey and there is a general consensus in the Turkish public opinion that the ultimate arbiter of the Turkish national interests are the Turkish army. The Turkish army is not a cast or a non-representative inward-looking body. One of the strongest parts of Turkey is that we have a very strong and very important middle class. Millions and millions of middle-class Turks associate themselves with the army and the army is definitely not going to step in and there is no such danger in Turkey. The Turkish army is not in politics. It assumes its role of defending the Turkish constitution, the Turkish unitary state and definitely the Turkish secular state. Thank you.

I happen to be a Kurd and have lived here for forty years. I wish to speak in the spirit of friendship. I must also tell you, Mr. Ambassador, that we Kurds are a very ancient and very polite people. That is why I waited so long before I got up. I allowed the Turkish Cypriots to speak first. When many years ago I joined the Times newspaper as a junior reporter on the Middle East, we had a very distinguished diplomatic correspondent called Louis. As it is the occupational hazard of diplomatic correspondents many foreign ambassadors got angry with him because of his commentary, so our editors came upon a formula. They used to say to foreign ambassadors, "Your Excellency, Louis has got ? blood in him - he hates governments". So, I can tell you Mr. Ambassador, that as a full-blooded Kurd, it has not been my idea of a nice night out to speak to any serving diplomat, let alone a Turkish serving diplomat, who insists on calling the people Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. In other words you have to first cease to be a Kurd in order to be a Turkish citizen. If you are willing to turn your back on three thousand years of Kurdish history, if you are willing to say, "Oh, it's a wonderful thing that our language is banned in teaching. It is a wonderful thing that it means that we cannot get our children Kurdish names", then you can become Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem.

Can Islamic civilisation and democracy be compatible? And, therefore, is there any room for Turkey at all in Europe? It is my belief that after forty years of reading Islamic history that Islamic civilisation and democracy are not compatible. You describe Turkey as a democratic state. Let me give you an example, a story about your own Prime Minister. When Mrs Çiller was Prime Minister, amazingly a woman being a Prime Minister of Turkey, an Englishman I knew found himself at a cocktail party beside one of the generals of the army. He said to the general, "Your Excellency, what do you think of the Prime Minister, Mrs Çiller?" and the general replied, "She is a good chick - she knows her place". This is the democratic state that over the past three years has...It is not in the interests of Turkey to say to 15 million people that it has no history. It is wonderful to be Turkish. Let them choose. That there are 27 Kurdish radio stations speaking in Kurdish is not true. On top of that I would like to say to my British audience that Turkey at the moment is heading for becoming 150 million people by 2050. Is it in the interests of the European Union to allow to become of member a nation of 150 million Muslims, who can in moment, of crisis resort to Islamic fundamentalism?

You have raised, of course, so many questions. I will try to make my remarks about some of the essential ones. There has never been a Turkish conquest of Kurds. Turks and Kurds have lived in the region together for centuries and centuries. As you know in the Middle East in the past and in present times political identities and political communities have never been linguistic or ethnic. They have been religious. The Ottoman Empire was based on a millet system and Turks and Kurds belong to the same millet system as Sunni Muslims, but there are also Alevi Turks and Alevi Kurds. So, the ethnicity is something, which has been brought to the Kurdish community, with a definite purpose of creating troubles and political division in Turkey. Turks and Kurds are flesh and blood. We do not make this distinction because we do not believe in the fact that there is a particular reason for any person to enhance its ethnic identity over its personal identity as a human being. If you put so much emphasis on your ethnic identity, you will end up with ethnic cleansing. We reject this in Turkey.

This is the reason why we talk about citizenship in Turkey. Citizenship transcends the linguistics, ethnic and religious particularisms. In Turkey every community, everyone, regardless of their origin, enjoys the same rights as everyone else. Perhaps for you the only real Kurd is one engaged in a bloodthirsty battle against a democratic system. But in Turkey we have Kurds that we call Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. It is not because we reject their Kurdish identity because this is not rejected in Turkey. The only thing that we reject is a collective identity as a different people to Turkish people. Turkey is not alone in this. You cannot talk about the peoples of France. You can have people of France in its diversity. Turkey has adopted the French system because our constitution says citizenship is for the Turkish people determined to maintain its unitary constitution, and the voting pattern of the Turks of Kurdish origin prove that and I have given the concrete example of the Hadep. The overwhelming majority of the Kurds in Turkey reject the alternative ethnic identity. They want to share their destiny with the rest of the country. I can understand your frustration and I have watched you many times on television. You are full of hatred and you only discharge yourself by insulting Turks because you are a racist, and I mean what I am saying. Thank you.

In Britain, Mr. Ambassador, we have very strict laws against inciting acts of violence and racial hatred and yet the British government allows a television station to broadcast by satellite under a British licence, which daily incites violence and racial hatred in Turkey and when the British government is asked to explain itself it hides behind the Independent Television Commission as though it has nothing to do with us, ignoring the fact that parliament has actually given the British government the power to give directions to the Independent Television Commission, where it is necessary, in order to comply with Britain's obligations, in this case particularly under the convention against acts of terrorism. What, may I ask the Ambassador, does his government think of this?

I think the problem with MED TV is the fact that no one watches it! You have a television station, which broadcasts in Kurdish, Syrian and in Arabic and in Turkish. So, when we bring scandal in front of our British colleagues, of course, they listen to us very carefully, but since they do not watch it they cannot understand what is going on. MED TV is as if Hezballah or Hamas or even the IRA had a television station. It is the same thing. You do not hear anything but "Kill! Kill! Kill!" This is not a culture of broadcasting. This is the broadcast of a terrorist organisation and this explains why the PKK killed seven members of Kurdish television broadcast in Turkey as soon as it started to broadcast in Kurdish not hatred but the Kurdish language, the Kurdish culture and the Kurdish news. I am sure that it is up to the British people, the British government and the ITC to assume their responsibilities and we are confident that the right decision will be taken by the British parliament and the British competent authorities. It is not up to us to teach the British what they have to do. Britain is an old country and it has tradition of assuming its responsibilities. Thank you.

One very important historical fact is omitted and I would like to remind the audience here. The then Turkish Prime Minister in 1974 came to London and consulted with the British government, with Harold Wilson, and asked them to jointly intervene in Cyprus but the then British government refused, so Turkey had to go it alone. Therefore, part of the blame for what has happened on the island can be put on that government on 1974. My question to the Ambassador is: would we have the same situation if the British government had jointly intervened with Turkey? That is my first question.

My second question is: the Turkish community on the island is subjected to embargoes, would the lifting of these embargoes not pave the way to a solution?

Definitely had the British government at that time gone along with the Prime Minister who happened to be Ecevit at that time, we would have averted the situation. This is for sure. And, of course, as I have always defended the thesis that the Greek Cypriots have the responsibility to assume they would have removed this embargo long before. And they would have given out very positive signals to the Turkish community on the island. And I still want to hope that it will come and if it comes unilaterally as a manifestation of their rule to live together in the same island with the Turkish Cypriots, it would have greatly contributed to the solution. Thank you very much.

My Lord Chairman, Your Excellency, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it was a great pleasure for me to undertake this task. The only thing is I am a bit confused by your instructions at the beginning. I am not certain whether I am speaking on the record or off the record. Five years ago when I was the Foreign Office Under-Secretary for Middle Eastern affairs, I was in Ankara for talks with allied colleagues, with the Turkish government, on the continued arrangements for policing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. And our Turkish interlocutor was Ambassador Sanberk and I had every opportunity then, as I know that many people in Britain have in the course of the past few years, that he has been Ambassador here to appreciate Ambassador Sanberk's quiet authority and his unfailing politeness and charm and we have seen plenty of evidence of that tonight.

The talks themselves in Ankara were not particularly testing and we reached agreement pretty easily. I feel, Ambassador, that tonight you have had a slightly rougher ride. I will not try and score the rounds because I think evidence over the past 48 hours is that that is a rather high risk activity but we are grateful to you for answering all our questions and not avoiding any of the difficult issues that have been raised. But you have done more than that, you have brought out for us two very important points which I am sure we do well to bear in mind. The first of these is the sheer complexity of the problems that Turkey faces. You listed some of your neighbours. As you look around you from the position of Ankara there must be hardly a bilateral relationship, with the honourable exception of Azerbaijan on my right, which does not cause you some difficulty. And I think we do well to remember and not to underestimate the difficulties that Turkey faces.

And the second point you have explained is the very deep-seated reasons that lie behind Turkey's approach to the European Union and wish to join. It is not an urgent issue - you mention ten years. But the onus and the obligation is on us in the European Union, and I would suggest particularly in this country, in the light of what you have explained to make sure that eventually in the long term we get this issue right. So, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to thank you on behalf of all of us for speaking with such openness and eloquence and for answering all our questions with such clarity and, if I may say so, unfailing amiability. Thank you very much indeed.