Western foreign policy has two principal aims: to maintain our security, and to protect and enhance our trading interests. Allied to those aims, and indirectly supportive of them, is concern for justice and the rule of law, protection of human rights, and the promotion of mutual respect and understanding between peoples.

Each of these factors applies in a greater or lesser degree to the island of Cyprus. The Eastern Mediterranean is important to Western security, to the situation in Iran, the Gulf and the Middle East and in relation to the southern flank of NATO, where relations between Turkey and Greece are of great importance. Western trading interests, whilst small in Cyprus itself, require stability in the region. Violations of human rights and breakdown of respect and understanding between peoples in the region threaten both of our principal foreign policy interests. Finally, Britain has residual legal rights and obligations relating to the island.

The Greek Cypriots claim that the Cyprus problem was caused by the landing of Turkish troops in 1974 and that if only they would withdraw, the problem would be solved. This is a serious misconception, for the modern Cyprus question began in 1960 and the landing of Turkish troops was the consequence, not the cause, of the problem. Moreover, there were in fact two military actions in 1974; the first was by Greece, which caused the second by Turkey.

The Greek Cypriot political parties DIKO and EDEK "are acting as if the Cyprus problem began and ended in 1974. They refrain from talking about the previous coups. The first coup was not in 1974, but only a few years after we had attained our independence. Had it not been for the first coup there would not have been the 1974 coup." (Greek Cypriot journalist, Aleccos Constantinides, Alithia 14.12.85).

The inhabitants of Cyprus have no common language except English and no common religion; nor have they, except at the surface, any common culture. In March 1963 Archbishop Makarios said "The [Independence] Agreements have created a State, but not a Nation." (Cyprus Mail 28.3.63) This being so, any approach to the Cyprus question which regards Cypriots as a nation is fundamentally flawed. "The famous Cypriot consciousness was invented and encouraged by the British in the 1920s to keep Greek nationalism at bay." - Prodromos Prodromou The Guardian 30th January 1995

There are in fact two peoples of Cyprus - the Turkish Cypriots numbering about 175,000 and the Greek Cypriots numbering about 500,000. The Turkish Cypriots are mainly Moslems and the Greek Cypriots are mainly adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church. The UN Secretary-General made it clear in 1992 (UN doc. S/24472) that sovereignty "emanates equally from both communities. One community cannot claim sovereignty over the other." Cyprus has never been part of the Greek state. It lies 40 miles from the coast of Turkey, and Turkish people have inhabited the island since the 12th century. Cyprus is 250 miles from the nearest Greek island (Rhodes), and Athens is 460 miles away.

"The Turkish Cypriot community possesses the same political status as the Greek Cypriot community. The two communities participate in negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus question on an equal footing, and the Greek Cypriot community should not enjoy any privileged position in the negotiations whether on substance or procedure by reason of the fact that it presents itself as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus." Eli Lauterpacht CBE QC (Opinion - UN doc. A/44/968, S/21463 (1990).

The Cyprus question can be stated shortly as follows: The partnership republic formed in 1960 between the two peoples of Cyprus broke down in 1963. For the time being, Greek and Turkish Cypriots live apart. Does the future of Cyprus lie in a new political association or in an arms length relationship based on willing and active co-operation between political equals, each secure in its own sovereign territory and each with its own customs, traditions and identity?

No solution to the Cyprus problem will work unless it is freely accepted by the inhabitants of the island who will have to live with it. Otherwise, there will be bloodshed again and there could be war between Turkey and Greece. There is therefore no point in trying to put pressure on Greece or Turkey to force either or both of the parties in Cyprus to accept the unacceptable.

On 15th August 1996 The Daily Telegraph wrote "Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their side and understandably fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish army withdraws. Almost nowhere in the world is there a lasting peace that is not based on people’s rights to govern themselves."

Everyone who wishes Cyprus well prefers to look to the future but many commentators will readily use the events of 1974 to argue that the present state of affairs is unacceptable. They do not however go back before 20th July 1974, and refusal to consider the preceding 15 years means that important legal and political questions wrongly determined in favour of the Greek Cypriots will remain undisturbed and will remain a continuing source of tension between the partners. The most important of these is acceptance of the Greek Cypriot regime as the government of all Cyprus and refusal to recognise the right of the Turkish Cypriots to establish their own state. It is therefore necessary to look in some detail at the reasons why the present situation has arisen and why, in consequence, both sides and particularly the less numerous Turkish Cypriots need reliable safeguards for their future.

One of the most remarkable features of the Cyprus question is the extent to which the Greek Cypriots have been able to repudiate solemn international agreements and violate the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots on a massive scale and yet by a quite astonishing feat of public relations, have secured for themselves recognition as the government of all Cyprus and have persuaded the world that they, and not the Turkish Cypriots, are the injured party. The consequence of this is that they have been able to extract one sided resolutions from the United Nations and other international organisations, and have been able to secure court judgments based on the fact of recognition which have been immensely damaging to the Turkish Cypriots (see the sections on Property and Trade Embargo below).

For more than twenty years past - ever since the overthrow of the 1960 Agreement - the Turkish Cypriots and their government have been faced with one of the hardest tasks in the whole range of international affairs - how to get the world to change its mind after it has got hold of the wrong end of the stick and clung to it year after year.

It is in the nature of governments and international organisations that they are reluctant to admit that they have been in the wrong, or even to think it possible that they may have been mistaken. But that is the simple truth about the position which the world at large has taken up in regard to Cyprus from 1964 onwards.

The Turkish Cypriots have, for more than thirty years, been deprived of an official voice in the world and have been deprived of the financial resources to match the Greek Cypriots in the presentation of their case to the world community. It is the purpose of this Briefing Note, published by members of the United Kingdom Parliament, to help redress the balance and to lay the foundations for an understanding of the real nature of the Cyprus question.

The remarkable changes which the world has seen since the Iron Curtain was torn down are the result of a realistic understanding by hard-headed statesmen of the economic, cultural and security interests of the peoples involved. It is all too easy to compare Cyprus with Western Europe or with other places and to say "If there, why not in Cyprus?" but as will be seen, there is rather more to it than that.

II INDEPENDENCE FOR CYPRUS

The Colonial Period

Cyprus became part of the Turkish Empire in 1571, at which time the population was a mixture of people whose origins were in many different parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. More than three hundred years later, on 4th June 1878, the island was leased to Britain by Turkey on terms that it was to be returned to Turkey when Britain no longer wanted it. However, Britain unilaterally annexed the island in 1914 and declared it a Crown Colony on 1st May 1925.

In 1879 the British began to allow Greeks to settle in Cyprus, and "patriotic committees" were set up in Greece to encourage the emigration of Greeks to Cyprus. On 10th January 1881 the High Commissioner informed the Colonial Secretary (CO 67/18) that there were about 600 Hellenic subjects on the island. Greece then began to send teachers, lawyers, doctors, and priests to organise the Greek community in Cyprus in favour of annexing the island to Greece, (ENOSIS). On 17th April 1895 the British Magistrate in Nicosia wrote that Greek schoolchildren had been organised to march through the Turkish quarter singing songs about "the slaughter of the hated Moslems." This kind of demonstration was still happening in 1996.

On 4th August 1900 the High Commissioner informed the Colonial Secretary (CO 67/124/26615) that the whole Greek school system on the island was being used as an organisation for Hellenic propaganda. This is still true in 1997.

On 19th December 1912, during the Balkan wars, the Acting High Commissioner sent a petition from the Turkish Cypriots to the Colonial Secretary urging him not to hand Cyprus over to Greece. The Acting High Commissioner added (CO 67/167/41168) "I fear that the Moslems have only too good reason to be apprehensive for their lives and property if the Hellenic element gets the upper hand." During this period many Turkish Cypriot families were forced by poverty and by fear of a Greek takeover to emigrate to Turkey. At the outbreak of war in 1914 many more left, and between then and 1939 about 8,000 Turkish Cypriots had settled in Turkey alone.

There is no doubt, although Greek Cypriots never say so, that ENOSIS (annexation to Greece), invested as it is with the most intense religious and nationalistic overtones, has been and probably still is, the principal obstacle to good relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, and even between Turkey and Greece. On 20th October 1950 on the occasion of his enthronement as Archbishop, the future President of Cyprus, Makarios, declared "I take the Holy Oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of uniting Cyprus to mother Greece."

The Greek Orthodox Church is very strong in Cyprus, and it is almost impossible for the secular leadership to take action of which the church leaders strongly disapprove. It is an article of religious faith for the church in Cyprus that the island be annexed to Greece, and any proposed settlement which excluded this possibility would almost certainly be rejected by the religious leadership.

The more recent Greek Cypriot leader, George Vassiliou, spoke of Cyprus on 26th January 1989 as "a Greek island and a bastion of Greece." That is the crux of the problem, for Cyprus is not a Greek island, but an island which belongs to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

As long ago as 1907 Winston Churchill (then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) said: "I think it only natural that the Cypriot people of Greek descent should regard their incorporation with their mother country as an ideal to be cherished; but I trust that those who feel so earnestly will not forget that they must show respect for the similar feelings of others."

The Turkish Cypriots are just as fervently committed against the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, but they do not advocate the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey, knowing that it would be just as objectionable to the Greek Cypriots as ENOSIS is to themselves. They see integration of Northern Cyprus with Turkey as a last resort, if all else fails.

Churchill’s advice was ignored, and from 1955 to 1960 the Greek Cypriot EOKA organisation, under the leadership of George Grivas, fought for ENOSIS; not independence. During the conflict hundreds of British people, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots were murdered, and thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from mixed villages where their homes and possessions had been destroyed.

Britain decided to decolonise the island, and in the House of Commons on 19th December 1956 the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, pledged that "it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status."

The 1960 Agreements

Although by then the Greek Cypriots were more numerous, the Turkish Cypriots had lived in Cyprus for more than 400 years as a distinct community; and in exercise of their right of self-determination they were willing to join in forming a new Republic embracing the whole of the island (less the British sovereign bases) only if that basic fact of political life in Cyprus was formally recognised.

The alternatives were two separate states, a condominium, division of the island between Greece and Turkey, restoration to Turkey under the 1878 Treaty, or continued British rule. The negotiations in Zurich and London preceding independence were long and difficult, but it was eventually agreed by way of compromise between all five participants; Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriots; that the new state would be a bi-communal Republic with a single territory but a unique Constitution which embodied an agreed political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and which prohibited the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other State.

At the conclusion of the negotiations the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, said "Sending cordial good wishes to all the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, I greet with joy the Agreement reached and proclaim with confidence that this day will be the beginning of a new period of progress and prosperity for our country".

On 6th March 1959 President Eisenhower endorsed the agreement as "a victory for common sense" an "imaginative act of statesmanship," and "a splendid achievement." (US Dept. of State Bulletin p. 367).

In the first Presidential elections in Cyprus Mr. John Clerides (father of Glafcos Clerides) stood against Makarios on a platform of opposition to the 1960 Agreements and lost by a majority of two to one of the Greek Cypriot electorate.

The bi-communal structure was fundamental to the 1960 accords, on the basis of which the Republic of Cyprus achieved independence, and recognition as a sovereign state from the international community. Accordingly, from its very inception the Republic of Cyprus was never a unitary state in which there is only one electorate with a majority and minority. The two communities were political equals and each existed as a political entity, just as both large and small states exist within the structure of the European Union. They did not however have the same constitutional rights because the agreements took into account the fact that there were more Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots.

The means by which the Constitution gave effect to the agreement were fourfold; political, legal, administrative, and military. The President was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot. Legislative authority was vested in a House of Representatives, of whom 70% would be Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots, but legislation and executive action required the concurrence of both the President and Vice-President on specified matters, including in particular foreign affairs. Moreover, legislation relating to certain matters of sensitivity as between the two communities required a separate majority of representatives from each community. A Treaty of Alliance (Cmnd. 1093) permitted Greece to station 950 troops in Cyprus and Turkey 650 troops.

The Turkish Cypriot people, knowing that they could not enforce the agreement themselves, would never have agreed to join the 1960 Republic if the Greek Cypriots had not accepted a Treaty of Guarantee which gave Turkey a legal right to intervene, with troops if necessary. The parties to the Treaty were the United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Independence was formally granted on 16th August 1960.

The case of Cyprus is sui generis, for there is no other State in the world which came into being as a result of two politically equal peoples coming together by the exercise by each of its sovereign right of self-determination, to create a unique legal relationship, which was in turn guaranteed by international treaty, to which each of them consented.

III CONSTITUTION IGNORED

It became clear very soon after independence that the Greek Cypriots did not intend to abide by the Constitution, and that their entry into that solemn legal obligation with the Turkish Cypriots in 1960 had been a deception. In a speech on 4th September 1962, at Panayia, Makarios said "Until this Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated."

On 9th April 1963 Makarios told The Times "The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an inspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this by establishing a Republic."

The Turkish Cypriots were told by the outside world to take no notice of statements of this kind. They were told that they were just rhetoric, or were for internal consumption within the Greek Cypriot community. However, the Turkish Cypriots were to discover very soon that when Greek Cypriot leaders make statements of that kind they should be taken seriously. Similar statements are still being made by Greek Cypriot leaders today, and Turkish Cypriots are still being urged not to take them seriously.

Article 173 of the Constitution provided that separate municipalities be established for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots refused to obey this mandatory provision and in order to encourage them to do so the Turkish Cypriots said they would not vote for the Government's taxation proposals. The Greek Cypriots remained intransigent, so the Turkish Cypriots took the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus. The court comprised one Greek Cypriot judge, one Turkish Cypriot judge, and a neutral President.

In February 1963 (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63) Archbishop Makarios declared on behalf of the Greek Cypriots that if the Court ruled against them they would ignore it. On 25th April 1963 the Court did rule against them and they did ignore it. The President of the Court (a German citizen) resigned and the rule of law in Cyprus collapsed.

In November 1963 the Greek Cypriots went further, and demanded the abolition of no less than eight of the basic articles which had been expressly included in the 1960 Agreement for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, to which abolition the Turkish Cypriots naturally refused to agree. The aim was to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending their ultimate expulsion from the island.

Accordingly, at Christmas 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriot communities across the island, and very many men, women, and children were killed. 270 of their mosques, shrines and other places of worship were desecrated. Thereafter Turkish Cypriot MP's, judges, and other officials were intimidated or prevented by force from carrying out their duties. On 2nd January 1964 the Daily Telegraph wrote "The Greek Cypriot community should not assume that the British military presence can or should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."

The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed the Cyprus question in 1987 (H.C. no. 23 of 1986-87), and reported unanimously on 2nd July that, "Although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been merely seeking to "operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation" this claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963 the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of ENOSIS and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective".

Insofar as the Constitution became unworkable, it was because the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to fulfil the obligations to which they had agreed. The doctrine of necessity in international law applies to supervening impossibility due to extraneous and unforseen causes. It does not apply to self-induced causes. There is in particular no doctrine of necessity known to international law which could justify the slaughter of innocent men, women, and children.

The Committee continued : "Moreover in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favour of ENOSIS, in blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee declares prohibited any action likely to promote directly or indirectly union with any other state or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2) of the Constitution is to similar effect).

And at para. 28 "The effect of the crisis of December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of Government into the hands of the Greek Cypriots alone. Claiming to be acting in accordance with "the doctrine of necessity" the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives enacted a series of laws which provided for the operation of the various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation."

Even Greece was embarrassed by this behaviour. On 19th April 1963 Foreign Minister Averoff had written to Makarios "It is not permissible for Greece in any circumstances to accept the creation of a precedent by which one of the contracting parties can unilaterally abrogate or ignore provisions that are irksome to it in international acts which this same party has undertaken to respect."

The 1960 Constitution had, by Article 182, expressly provided that its basic Articles could not in any way be amended, whether by way of variation, addition, or repeal. Any fundamental change to the Constitution would require agreement with the Turkish Cypriots and the consent of the Guarantor powers, but this was never sought or given.

The UK Commons Committee continued at para, 29 "Equally damaging from the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they considered to be their effective exclusion from representation at, and participation in, the international fora where their case could have been deployed............." "An official Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene virtually disappeared overnight." It is not therefore surprising that the world has been persuaded to the Greek Cypriot point of view.

The United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the legal order in Cyprus by force, but actually rewarded it by treating the by then wholly Greek Cypriot administration as if it were the Government of Cyprus (Security Council Res. 186 of 1964). This acceptance has continued to the present day, and reflects no credit upon the United Nations, nor upon Britain and the other countries who have acquiesced in it.

IV MASSACRES OF TURKISH CYPRIOT CIVILIANS

The civilian massacres of 1963, 1967, and 1974 are of such importance to an understanding of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position to this day that no apology is made for quoting from the contemporaneous reports in some detail.

"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the constitution Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot attack began in December 1963" (Lt. Gen George Karayiannis of the Greek Cypriot militia "Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The General is referring to the notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the island to Greece. This plan was prepared in 1963.

"The Akritas Plan destroyed the only compromise ever reached between Greece and Turkey and between Greek and Turkish Cypriots about Cyprus. It revived bloodshed and hatred. It thrust Cyprus and its peoples back into the extremes of ENOSIS and partition. It was bound sooner or later to bring some kind of intervention from Turkey. This rash, wicked, conspiracy was an act of supreme folly by the Greek Cypriot leaders, who still refuse to admit their wrongdoing. They continue to accuse others of bringing undeserved disasters upon them, but the truth is that it was they who broke up the bi-communal state and separated the Greeks and Turks from one another." Rauf Denkta? 4.7.89.

On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."

On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on 26th December 1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots, at Limassol, was reported by The Observer on 16th February 1964, and there were many more. On 17th February 1964 the Washington Post reported that Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide."

On 1st January 1964 the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the Turkish homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have created more devastation. Under roofs which had caved in I found a twisted mass of bed springs, children's cots, and grey ashes of what had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighbouring village of Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were all Turkish Cypriot. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to any Greek Cypriot house."

On 31st December 1963 "The Guardian" had reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as the Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the wife and children of the Turkish Cypriot head of army medical services - allegedly by a group of forty men, many in army boots and greatcoats." Although the Turkish Cypriots fought back as best they could, there were no massacres of Greek Cypriot civilians.

On 2nd April 1988 The Guardian published a report written by Commander Packard, a British officer serving in Cyprus at the time. "One of Packard’s first tasks was to find out what happened to the Turkish Cypriot hospital patients.... It appeared that Greek medical staff had slit the throats of Turkish patients as they lay in their beds. Their bodies were taken to a farm north of the city where they were fed into mechanical choppers."

On 10th September 1964 the Secretary-General reported (UN doc. S/5950):

"UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances, ......... it shows that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia, 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."

British troops in Cyprus at the time did what they could to protect the Turkish Cypriots, and their efforts are remembered to this day, but the scale and ferocity of the Greek Cypriot attacks made their task impossible. On 6th February 1964 a British patrol found armed Greek Cypriot police attacking the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Sozomenos. They were unable to stop the attack.

On 13th February 1964 the Greeks and Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol with tanks, killing 16 and injuring 35. On 15th February 1964 "The Daily Telegraph" reported: "It is a real military operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the six thousand inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot Quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman for the Greek Cypriot Government has recognised this officially. It is hard to conceive how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened."

Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral President of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus told Die Welt on 27th December 1963 "Makarios bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility of the recent tragic events. His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of their rights." In an interview with UPI press agency on 30th December 1963 he said: "All this happened because Makarios wanted to remove all constitutional rights from the Turkish Cypriots."

More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still missing without trace from these massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful events were not the responsibility of "the Greek Colonels" of 1974, or an unrepresentative handful of Greek Cypriot extremists. The persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of policy on the part of the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, which has to this day made no serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.

The UK Commons Select Committee found that, "There is little doubt that much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population, was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership".

The Greek Cypriots sometimes allege that it was they who were attacked, by the Turkish Cypriots who were determined to wreck the 1960 agreements. However, the Turkish Cypriots were not only outnumbered by nearly four to one; they were also surrounded in their villages by armed Greek Cypriots, they had no way of protecting their women and children, and Turkey was 40 miles away across the sea. The very idea that in those circumstances the Turkish Cypriots were the aggressors, is absurd.

In his memoirs, the American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, said "Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that." The fact is however that neither the US, the UK, the UN, nor anyone, other than Turkey eleven years later, ever took effective action to prevent it. The British Government recorded (doc. 1057 of 15.2.64) that George Ball "thought that Makarios’ aim was to get the Cyprus problem into the UN orbit where the slogan of self-determination, supported by the communist bloc and the neutralists, could exert pressure towards the establishment of an independent unitary state, where he could do what he liked with the Turkish Cypriots."

V DIVISION OF THE ISLAND IN 1964

The Turkish Cypriots were forced to withdraw into defended enclaves, and it was therefore in 1964, not in 1974, that Cyprus was divided. In 1964 the Turkish Cypriots had to establish an elected authority to govern themselves whilst confined in their defended enclaves.

On 14th January 1964 "Il Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is relentless. This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of Plato do not cover up their barbaric and ferocious behaviour."

The UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (UN doc. S/8286): "When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first part of 1964 thousands of Turkish-Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish-Cypriot villages and areas."

Greek Cypriots often claim that the Turkish Cypriots withdrew voluntarily from their positions in the State, but this is not correct. They were excluded by threats to their personal safety. Further, the Commons Select Committee found that "When in July 1965 the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives had sought to resume their seats they were told that they could do so only if they accepted the legislative changes to the operation of the Constitution enacted in their absence" (ie. if they agreed to fundamental constitutional changes to the great disadvantage of their community, imposed upon them by force of arms).

Accordingly, even if there had been any substance to Greek Cypriot claims that they were operating the government alone of necessity because the Turkish Cypriots were leaving their places vacant, there can be no justification for that claim after July 1965.

The Select Committee continued: "In February 1966 Makarios declared that the 1960 Agreements had been abrogated and buried."

In September 1964 the Secretary-General had reported to the Security Council (UN doc. 5950): "In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish Cypriot community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government." The trade of the Turkish Cypriot community had considerably declined during the period, and unemployment reached a very high level of approximately 25,000 breadwinners.

Turkish-Cypriots had become refugees in their own land. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber had dropped considerably, as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased in 1964. Furthermore, a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half the entire Turkish Cypriot population came to be on relief.

During the period 1963 to 1974 the freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots was severely restricted (Un docs. S/5764, S/5950, S/7350); they were denied postal services (UN docs. S/5950. S/7001); Their access to building materials, electrical equipment, motor parts, fuel, chemicals and many other commodities was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5950, S/7350); and Turkish-Cypriot refugees had to live in tents and caves.

On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General reported "The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish Cypriot communities, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure." (UN doc. S/5950).

On 24th July 1965 the United Kingdom formally protested the unlawful action of the Greek Cypriots, but continued to deal with them as the Government of Cyprus, and took no effective action to stop them doing as they pleased. In his memoirs published in 1987 former British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, James Callaghan, records that, "there is no question that the Turkish Cypriots had for many years been denied their political rights under the 1960 Constitution, and their basic human rights".

The United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the rest of the world have put political expediency before principle, and failed to condemn this appalling behaviour. Greek Cypriots are guilty of genocide but no action has ever been taken against them. Instead they have been rewarded by recognition as the Government of all Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots by contrast were frozen out of the UN, the Commonwealth and almost every other international organisation, and were not even allowed to be heard when many important decisions affecting their future were made. The General Assembly of the United Nations is particularly guilty in this respect.

Resolution 186 of 4th March 1964 is the first UN Security Council Resolution which recognised the Greek Cypriot regime as the "Government of Cyprus." The status conferred by this act of betrayal by the United Nations itself has enabled the Greek Cypriots for more than thirty years to treat the Turkish Cypriots as a mere community, to take most of the international aid for themselves, to embargo Turkish Cypriot trade and communications with the outside world, to occupy the Cyprus chair in all international institutions, and to convince the world that they, and not the Turkish Cypriots are the injured party.

Sir Anthony Kershaw, Chairman of the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs until 1987 explained in a speech in Cyprus on 23rd October 1990 how the UN came to accept the Greek Cypriots as the Cyprus Government as follows:

"It was decided that UN troops should be sent to preserve order, but the UN can only send troops if the legal government of the country concerned asks for them. The only organisation which could in 1964 be called the Government of Cyprus was the administration headed by Makarios. The Turkish Cypriots pointed out that this was not the legal government of Cyprus but such was the pressure of the times that the UN said: Look your people are dying - let's get the troops out right away and the lawyers can sort it out later.

So it was decided, but since that time the UN has treated the Greek Cypriots as the only government of Cyprus, basing this upon a treaty and a constitution which had been repudiated and broken by the Greek Cypriot government itself. I do not deny that the Greek Cypriot government is the de facto government of the South of Cyprus. It has all the attributes of sovereignty, but so has the government of Northern Cyprus."

In the opinion of Mr. Monroe Leigh, the distinguished American international lawyer "The mere fact of international recognition, no matter how widespread, cannot excuse or confer legitimacy upon the violations of both constitutional law and international treaty law through which the Greek Cypriot regime usurped the name as well as the government of the Republic of Cyprus." (Written opinion 20.7.1990).

In 1965 the UN General Assembly actually went so far, in Resolution 2077, as to express its confidence in the goodwill and humanity of the Greek Cypriot regime, which had been shown on the clearest possible evidence to have dishonoured international agreements, subverted constitutional government, and violated human rights on a massive scale.

Still not confident that they could eliminate the Turkish Cypriots without help from Greece, the Greek Cypriots began to augment their forces soon after the events of 1963. In his book "Democracy at Gunpoint" Andreas Papandreou recalls that in 1964 "A clandestine operation began on a huge scale; of nightly shipments of arms and "volunteers" who arrive in Cyprus in civilian clothes and then join their Greek Cypriot units."

"Newsweek" had likewise reported on 27th July 1964 that: "Before dawn each day the great iron doors of the port of Limassol are slammed shut... UN troops are barred. A few hours later the doors swing open and covered lorries, weaving on overloaded springs, roar out of the port and head toward the Troodos mountains."

Despite their withdrawal into defended enclaves, the Turkish Cypriots were subjected to a further massacre of civilians in 1967. On 27th March the Greeks and Greek Cypriots shelled the village of Mari for four hours. On 15th November 2,000 armed men with artillery and armoured forces attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Ayios Theodoros. At the same time the village of Getcikale (Kophinou) was attacked. During these attacks UN soldiers watched helpless as women children, and old men were killed - many burned alive in their own homes - and 50 houses were destroyed. Only warning flights by the Turkish Air Force prevented further massacres at this time, and forced the withdrawal of some of the mainland Greek forces which had been illegally built up in Cyprus.

VI THE EVENTS OF 1974

In 1971 General Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again committed to making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to Greece. In a speech to the Greek Cypriot armed forces (Quoted in "New Cyprus" May 1987) Grivas said. "The Greek forces from Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus upon the Turks. We want ENOSIS but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will. We are strong and we shall do so."

Greek Invasion

By 15th July 1974 a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had assembled in Cyprus and with their backing the Greek Cypriot National Guard overthrew Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as "President." They immediately began to murder both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and demonstrated the same brutality as they had employed against the British from 1955 to 1959. Turkish Cypriots appealed to the Guarantor powers for help, but only Turkey was willing to make any effective response.

On 22nd July Washington Star News reported: "Bodies littered the streets and there were mass burials.... People who were told by Makarios to lay down their guns were shot by the National Guard."

Even Greek Cypriots sought Turkey’s help. In her memoirs, Greek Cypriot MP Rina Katsellis, says "16th July 1974 Is Makarios alive? Is he dead? The Makarios supporters arrested, the EOKA-B supporters freed .... I did not shed a tear, why should I? Did the stupidity and fanaticism deserve a tear? There are some who beg Turkey to intervene. They prefer the intervention of Turkey." 18th July 1974 "My God!...Everyone is frozen with fear..the old man who asked for the body of his son was shot on the spot.. The tortures and executions at the central prison ... everyone is frozen with horror. Nothing is sacred to these people, and they call themselves Greeks! ... we must not keep that name any longer."

Turkey Responds

In his book "The Way the Wind Blows" former British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said "I was convinced of the view that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to treat the Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and partition of the island."

"Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963, called on the guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the island. When Britain did nothing Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied its northern part." (Daily Telegraph 15.8.96.)

Turkey (at that time ruled by the Social Democrats) sent troops to Cyprus on 20th July 1974.

The 1976 UK House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus found (HC 331 1975/76 para. 22), that Turkey had proposed joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee, and this was confirmed by Prime Minister Ecevit on 14th August 1974 (Daily Telegraph 15th August). However the Labour Government in Britain refused to take any effective action, even though they had troops and aircraft in the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus.

They argued that Britain was under no duty to take military action, but Article II provided that Britain would guarantee the state of affairs established by the 1960 Constitution, which it manifestly failed to do. The Select Committee concluded that "Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the (Labour) Government refuses to give."

"On 20th July 1974 Turkey intervened under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee" - (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office doc. CPS/75, Jan., 1987).

"Turkey exercised its right of intervention in accordance with Article IV of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960." (Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 29th July 1974).

In July 1974, after the first phase of the Turkish intervention, an international conference was held at Geneva between Turkey, Greece and Britain. It was agreed that Greek and Greek Cypriot forces would leave all the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, but showing their customary disregard for international agreements they proceeded instead to murder almost the entire civilian population of six Turkish Cypriot enclaves in both the north and south of the island, and despite the presence in Cyprus of UN troops.

It is argued that even if the first phase of the Turkish intervention was legal the extension of the area under Turkish control in the second phase from 14th August to 16th August 1974 was illegal since there was no longer any subsisting breach of the Treaty. However, the facts do not support this view.

More Massacres of Turkish Cypriots

In the village of Tokhni on 14th August 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and shot. (Times, Guardian, 21st August)

In Zyyi on the same day all the Turkish-Cypriot men aged between 19 and 38 were taken away by Greek-Cypriots and were never seen again. On the same day Greek-Cypriots opened fire in the Turkish-Cypriot neighbourhood of Paphos killing men, women, and children indiscriminately. On 23rd July 1974 the Washington Post reported "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived." (See also Times, Guardian, 23rd July).

"The Greeks began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees said. Kazan Dervi_, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been staying with her uncle. The [Greek Cypriot] National Guard came into the Turkish sector and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other relatives taken away as prisoners. And later heard her uncle had been shot." (Times 23.7.74)

"Before my uncle was taken away by the soldiers, he shouted to me to run away. I ran to the streets, and the soldiers were shooting all the time. I went into a house and I saw a woman being attacked by soldiers. They were raping her. Then they shot her in front of my eyes. I ran away again and Turkish men and women looked after me. They were escaping as well. They broke holes in the sides of houses, so we could get away without going into the streets. There were lots of women and children screaming, and soldiers were firing at us all the time".

On 28th July the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot men had been shot in Alaminos. On 24th July 1974 "France Soir" reported "The Greeks burned Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the villages around Famagusta. Defenceless Turkish villagers who have no weapons live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in tents in the forests. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity."

On 22nd July Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had called upon the UN to "stop the genocide of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared "Turkey has accepted a cease-fire, but will not allow Turkish-Cypriots to be massacred" (Times 23rd July). At the beginning of the Second Geneva Conference he said "A solution which is not based on geographical separation will not work. It is out of the question for us to entrust the safety of the Turkish Cypriots to the Greeks, who cannot even rule themselves. The areas around the Turkish forces are being mined, and the Turkish Cypriot villages are still under siege."

The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus reported in 1976 "The second phase of military operations was inevitable in the view of your committee as the position reached by Turkish forces at the time of the first ceasefire was untenable militarily".

The German newspaper Die Ziet wrote on 30 August 1974 "the massacre of Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their (August) intervention".

Sir Anthony Kershaw explained the situation as follows in his speech on 23rd October 1990:

"In order to protect the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey intervened in exercise of her rights under article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. No one has ever suggested that was illegal but they have gone on to say that the continuing use of troops, not to restore the 1960 Constitution but to enforce partition was illegal.

But does this not ignore the reality of the situation? In law it is said that the Turks were invoking the Guarantee; but to say that they were obliged to work for no result except the restoration of the 1960 Constitution is absurd. That Constitution had ceased to exist. The reconciliation of the law with the actual political situation, or indeed with ordinary common sense, was becoming more difficult. The Turks came to protect the lives of the Turkish Cypriots and they had good reason to know that the restoration of the 1960 Constitution was not the way to do that. The only way to do that was with troops on the ground."

The Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos Sampson on 26th February 1981 in which he is reported as saying "Had Turkey not intervened I would not only have proclaimed ENOSIS but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus."

The British Foreign Secretary answered "yes" to the following question from the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (HC. 331 1975/76, page 55, para. 141): "Would the Foreign Secretary agree that we could hardly restore the 1960 Constitution, since at least two of the provisions which were enshrined in the Constitution, the separate municipalities and the Turkish (Cypriot) share of the police and civil service, were never in fact implemented?"

"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12 years since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord Willis (Lab.) House of Lords 17th December 1986 (Hansard, col. 223)

On 12th March 1977 Makarios declared "It is in the name of ENOSIS that Cyprus has been destroyed."

Turkey, having defeated the Sampson coup in 1974, could hardly be expected to return the Turkish Cypriots to their former plight, and had no choice but to extend its protection in August 1974 and to maintain it until such time as the security of the Turkish Cypriots could otherwise be effectively guaranteed. Turkey has since that time encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate an agreed alternative to the 1960 Republic, and Turkey has supported the acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots of successive UN plans for a settlement. By Resolution 889 (1993) the Security Council "welcomes the declared support of the Government of Turkey for the package of confidence-building measures."

It seems that remorse among many Greek Cypriots for the appalling events of 1963 to 1974 is even today more for the fact that their plan did not succeed and for the resultant damage which they have suffered, than for the fact that it was ever attempted. There is little doubt that the Greek Cypriot ambition for ENOSIS, was a major cause of the breakdown of the Constitution and the dreadful events of 1963 - 1974. Greek Cypriots claim that today dreams of ENOSIS are dead. This is improbable, but even if it were true the Turkish Cypriots have as much reason to fear Greek Cypriot as Greek, domination.

VII TWO STATES EMERGE

Turkey's action in 1974 created a safe haven for the Turkish Cypriots, just as seventeen years later the western powers, with Turkey's help, created a safe haven for the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq.

Britain should have taken the lead at the United Nations as from 1963 to ensure that no international acceptance was given to any "Government of Cyprus" which continued to be in breach of the 1960 agreement. The Cyprus seat should have remained vacant until it could again be lawfully occupied. Instead Britain did the exact opposite and took the lead in securing the adoption of the now notorious Security Council Resolution 353 in 1974 which, after all that had happened, continued to treat the Greek Cypriot regime as the Government of Cyprus.

During the events of 1974, and following a formal exchange of populations agreement made between Rauf Denkta? and Glafcos Clerides in 1975, Turkish Cypriots moved to the North and Greek Cypriots moved to the South. Many innocent people suffered on both sides, and many on both sides lost their homes and their possessions. The Greek Cypriots did not however suffer such extreme hardship as the Turkish Cypriots had suffered in the period 1964-74, because a massive international relief programme was mobilised to help them. Neither in 1964 nor 1974 did the Turkish Cypriots receive any relief, except from Turkey.

On 1st February 1966 in Athens the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, had already declared: "They [the Zurich & London Agreements] today stand abrogated and buried. Neither Turkey nor any other power can breathe life into them again."

30th July 1974 the Geneva Declaration of the Guarantor powers recognised:

(a) that Constitutional Government no longer existed in Cyprus

(b) the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations; one Turkish Cypriot and the other Greek Cypriot.

The 1960 agreement having been repudiated by the conduct of the Greek Cypriots, and indeed expressly abrogated by the Greek Cypriot leaders, Turkish Cypriots could not live for long in a political limbo, so On 13th February 1975 they declared Northern Cyprus to be a Federated State, with a democratic constitution, but with the declared intention that it should one day form part of a federation for the whole of Cyprus.

Once more the UN showed its partiality, and in Security Council Resolution 367 "regretted" the decision of the Turkish Cypriots, while continuing to reward the unilateral decision of the Greek Cypriots in 1963 to impose their own autonomous administration on Cyprus. There is an inherent contradiction in this resolution, which stresses negotiations between the two communities on an equal footing and on the other hand regrets the assertion by the Turkish Cypriots of the statehood that evinced their need to possess equal standing as a State with the Greek Cypriots. (Lauterpacht. op cit.) It is also to be noted that the negotiations which the Security Council endorsed and wished to see continued were between the two communities, not between the Republic of Cyprus and some secessionist body.

No progress toward settlement having been made, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 15th November 1983, but still they expressly declared that they wished to work towards a new federal Constitution for the whole of Cyprus. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus today is a multi-party democracy, with a free judiciary, a free press, and free trade unions.

Again Britain, the United Nations, and the world in general deplored this step. The Security Council, by Resolutions 541 and 550, purported to declare the Declaration of Independence "legally invalid," and called upon states not to recognise the TRNC. However, it has never specified whether the constitutional law of Cyprus or international law is said to be the basis of such "illegality." If constitutional law, it has never explained how the 1960 constitution, having been repudiated and expressly abrogated by the Greek Cypriot side as long ago as 1963, could still be binding upon the Turkish Cypriot side in 1983.

If the Security Council relied on treaty-based international law, the foundation of the 1960 treaties was the joint participation of both communities in the government of Cyprus in the manner laid down in those treaties, but that foundation had been destroyed by the Greek Cypriots and no longer existed. It was that action which was incompatible with the Treaties, not the creation of a new political structure by the Turkish Cypriots to fill the vacuum in which they had been left. "If the Security Council had assessed the situation as a whole, it could not possibly have concluded that the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot community violated the controlling legal instruments while the conduct of the Greek Cypriot community did not. Nor could it have reached any other conclusion than that the action of the Greek Cypriot community justified the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot community". (E. Lauterpacht op.cit.)

If general international law was relied upon, there is no general principle which prohibits the dissolution of a constitutional arrangement between two peoples. When the East Pakistanis decided to dissolve their relationship with the West Pakistanis and form their own State, called Bangladesh, the new state was recognised almost immediately. More recently the emergence of new states from the chaos of Yugoslavia has been recognised. In the Cyprus case the pre-existing relationship had actually been repudiated by the Greek Cypriots.

In purporting to make a legal finding, the Security Council did not proceed in a manner appropriate to the performance of a judicial function, and the judgment, in the form of a draft resolution, was already in circulation before the debate began. The Security Council is a political body. It should not purport to act as a judicial body or expect to be respected as such. The Resolutions were tainted by such a degree of selectivity and incompleteness as to render them arbitrary and discriminatory and thus not well-founded in law. It follows that the call to states not to recognise the TRNC was not legally justified" (E. Lauterpacht op.cit.)

On 29th March 1965 (UN doc. S/6252) the UN Mediator for Cyprus, Dr. Galo Plaza, had said "It is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the (1960) Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution governed by the treaties. .... The events since December 1963 have created a situation which makes it psychologically and politically impossible to return to the previous situation."

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is sometimes described as a "breakaway state," but there was nothing to break away from. It was the Greek Cypriots who broke away from the 1960 Republic in 1963 and set up a wholly Greek Cypriot Republic which they continued, and still continue, to call the Republic of Cyprus. They have usurped even the name of the bi-communal Republic.

VIII PERSONAL RELATIONS

It is sometimes suggested that since personal relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots have traditionally been good it is only the Turkish army which is keeping them apart. This is a fallacy. The fact that personal relations were often good did not prevent the murder of Turkish Cypriots in 1963, 1967, and 1974 by Greek Cypriot neighbours whom they knew by name. The Turkish Cypriots have made it clear by an overwhelming majority that they do not wish to integrate with the Greek Cypriots.

Personal relations between the two peoples or between their leaders are not the issue, and serve only to mislead. The situation is very different when the peoples of Cyprus deal with each other collectively and when their vital interests are at stake. They lived alongside each other whilst the British ruled Cyprus, because the British authorities kept the peace, but even then, as already noted, the Turkish Cypriots suffered.

Cyprus is also quite different to countries elsewhere in the world where families are parted by frontiers, for almost all the Turkish Cypriots are in the North and Greek Cypriots in the South. The few Greek Cypriots who remain in the North do so of their own free will, and may join their families in the South whenever they choose. There is no parallel between the "Green Line" frontier in Cyprus and the Berlin wall. The Berlin wall was not erected to protect West Germans from aggression, and the "Green Line" in Cyprus does not divide a nation. It was drawn by a British officer in 1963 to protect the Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriot gunmen, and had it not been drawn there would be few Turkish Cypriots left in Cyprus today.

IX THE MAIN ISSUES TODAY

Security

The Greek Cypriots call for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. They assure the Turkish Cypriots that attitudes toward them have changed, but as recently as April 1994 twenty of the very few Turkish Cypriots working in the South were beaten up by Greek Cypriots and thrown out of the country. Beatings and border violations continue to this day. The arms build-up in the South continues, with preparations for a Greek naval base. In July 1994 the Greek Cypriots announced a 5,000 man increase in the strength of their militia, and in 1996 the purchase of missiles (see below). The Greek Cypriots regularly cut off the electricity supply to the North until the Turkish Cypriots built their own power station, and they still continue their efforts to ruin the Turkish Cypriot economy.

In September 1994 the Chairman of the Greek Cypriot reserve army officers, Kypros Manulas, confirmed that ENOSIS had not been abandoned, and said that an important aim of the reserve was to "liberate" the North by attacks. (Greek Cypriot newspaper "Simerini" 11.9.94).

Even the Greek Cypriots accept that the Turkish Cypriots have reason to fear for their safety if the Turkish army left, and therefore propose complete demilitarisation, save for a UN controlled international force. They accept that there should be external guarantees. Provided that no guarantor has a unilateral right of intervention!

No Turkish Cypriot leader could agree to this proposal, for the Turkish Cypriots are outnumbered and would be again at the mercy of the Greek Cypriot militia as they were between 1963 and 1974. It would be quite impossible to disarm these paramilitaries even if the political will existed, and the British army never succeeded in doing so.

So far as an international peacekeeping force is concerned, there has been such a force in Cyprus since 1964, but it was unable to prevent the extreme hardship to which Turkish Cypriots were exposed in their enclaves from 1964 to 1974. Nor was it able to prevent the Greek Cypriot attack upon Turkish Cypriots in 1967, nor to prevent the Sampson coup and the mass murder of Turkish Cypriots in 1974. In recent years the UN force has even been unable to prevent an organised band of women from crossing the UN buffer-zone and confronting Turkish Cypriots in an aggressive manner (see below). To their shame some well-meaning western women have allowed themselves to be associated with this defiance of the United Nations.

For the Turkish Cypriots, history seemed to be repeating itself, for it was exactly that kind of violence, ostensibly by "students" or "unruly elements", but in fact backed by the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, which led to the slaughter of Turkish Cypriots at Christmas 1963. It is precisely because there are so many Greeks and Greek Cypriots who think that problems can be solved by violence, and because their leaders are unwilling or unable to control them, that Turkey had to intervene to save the Turkish Cypriots in 1974.

Since international guarantees and UN troops have demonstrably failed to protect the Turkish Cypriots, they cannot be expected to ask Turkey to withdraw its troops until such time (if ever) as lasting trust and confidence between the two communities has been established.

The Turkish Cypriots remember Britain's failure to implement its guarantee in 1974, and the failure of the United Nations to protect the moslems of Bosnia from genocide. They have concluded that the only soldiers willing to fight, and if necessary to die, to protect Turkish Cypriot families are Turkish and Turkish Cypriot soldiers themselves. Since Turkish Cypriots alone would be heavily outnumbered by Greek Cypriots, a credible military presence from Turkey is therefore essential. There is no possibility that any Turkish Cypriot leader could negotiate away an effective Turkish military guarantee.

The 1984 UN plan acknowledged the need for a Turkish military presence, and this was acceptable to the Greek Cypriot House of Assembly, which censured the then President, Kyprianou, for refusing to agree to it.

The European Commission has estimated that there are 30,000 Turkish troops and 4,000 Turkish Cypriot troops in Cyprus, with 26,000 Turkish Cypriot reserves. (Com (93) 313 para. 18). This includes the logistic support units, and is the minimum number needed to defend the very long border between north and south, much of it in mountainous terrain. The border has to be defended 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and a soldier can not be effective for more than eight hours per day. Soldiers must also be absent for leave, sickness, training, and other reasons.

Across the border, the Commission estimated that there are 10,400 full time Greek Cypriot troops, with 100,000 reserves, backed by about 1,000 mainland Greek troops. A total of 111,400 men, and there are probably more today.

It is no use saying, as some commentators do, that Turkey is only 40 miles away, and can fly in reserves if Northern Cyprus is attacked. The difficulty is that defence in depth against surprise attack is impossible. The main centres of Turkish Cypriot population are very close, and sometimes only yards away, from the Greek Cypriot forces. Reserves could, and probably would, heavily defeat any Greek Cypriot attack, but they would be too late to save the lives of thousands of Turkish Cypriot civilians. They would also have to contend with modern ground to air missiles with which the Greek Cypriots are now equipping themselves.

The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have nevertheless accepted, as part of an overall settlement, that a timetable for reductions of Turkish and Greek troops will be agreed before any transitional government takes office. The enormous risk which this involves for the Turkish Cypriots is the measure of their political will to achieve a settlement.

Much as one wishes to look to the future, the abuse of Greek Cypriot power before 1974 must inevitably condition the approach of the Turkish Cypriots to any future political association with their Greek Cypriot neighbours. In fact, Greek Cypriot actions since 1974 have led Turkish Cypriots to trust them even less.

Recent Border Incidents

The Greek Cypriots have very little respect for the UN peacekeeping force, and have consistently violated the buffer zone established by the UN to reduce tension between the two sides.

The UN Secretary General reported (S/20663 31.5.89) that "following violent demonstrations in the UN buffer zone in November 1988 the [Greek Cypriot] Government had given assurances that it would in future do everything necessary to ensure respect for the buffer zone." Nevertheless the Secretary General had to report that on 19th March 1989 "an estimated 2,000 women crossed the buffer zone at Lymbia and some managed to cross the Turkish forces line. A large number of Turkish Cypriot women arrived shortly after and mounted a counter-demonstration, remaining on their side of the line. Unarmed Turkish (in fact Turkish Cypriot) soldiers opposed the demonstrators, and thanks largely to the manner in which they and the Turkish Cypriot police dealt with the situation the demonstration passed without serious incident."

The European Commission on Human Rights (Case 15318/89) found that the demonstration constituted a serious threat to peace and public order on the demarcation line in Cyprus."

Again, despite the assurances of the Greek Cypriot Government The Guardian had to report on 18th November 1989: "In coordinated demonstrations hundreds of students broke through UN barricades after stoning peacekeeping troops, some of whom were threatened with iron bars. In a dangerous new development several petrol bombs were thrown at the UN force. According to intelligence reports members of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in civilian clothes have been seen participating."

No amount of conciliatory words by Greek Cypriot leaders can erase the Turkish Cypriot memory of this event nor disguise the reality which the Guardian reporter saw. What confidence could Turkish Cypriots have in the UN guarantees if Greek Cypriots still show no respect for UN troops?

On 4th February 1989 a Turkish Cypriot soldier on duty on the Turkish Cypriot side of the Green Line was shot dead by a Greek Cypriot national guardsman.

In April 1994 the Greek Cypriot National Guard fired on a lone Turkish Cypriot sentry at the Ermu Street guard post in Nicosia.

On 7th October 1995 a Turkish Cypriot farmer, Erkan E_mez, was snatched from his fields, and tortured by Greek Cypriot police. On 5th March 1996 the US State Department report on human rights in Cyprus said: E_mez, appears to have been severely beaten in the period during and immediately after his arrest and eventually required ten days of hospitalization. According to some eye-witnesses hooded police officials continued beating him even as he was being admitted to hospital."

On 8th November 1995 hundreds of schoolchildren were given permission by Greek Cypriot officials to be absent from school. They participated in a violent riot under the guidance of teachers, in which Greek Cypriots seized a UN observation post and hoisted a Greek flag in the buffer zone. It is worth noting that it is almost always the Greek flag, not the Greek Cyprus flag, which is used on these occasions.

On 3rd June 1996 at 6.30 am a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman in uniform was shot when he violated the buffer zone and refused to stop when challenged by Turkish Cypriot sentries. On 6th August 1996 armed Greek Cypriots tried to abduct a Turkish Cypriot shepherd from the buffer zone.

On 11th August 1996 several thousand young people, many on motorcycles who were organised to ride from Berlin, were encouraged to break into the UN buffer zone and confront the Turkish Cypriots on their border. They rampaged in the buffer zone, in defiance of the UN forces, setting fire to vegetation, brandishing knives, and throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. They tore down the UN barbed-wire fence near Dherynia, and one was beaten to death in a violent struggle with Turkish Cypriots. Another was shot when he broke through the Turkish Cypriot line and tried to desecrate their flag. Instead of regretting these incidents and apologising to the UN and to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots have treated the two hooligans as national heroes.

Neither of these men should have been killed, and the Turkish Cypriots must exercise greater restraint in future, whatever the provocation, for there are those on the Greek Cypriot side who are deliberately putting the lives of their young people at risk for political purposes. The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ leader Hadjicostas was asked by Selides magazine (27.8.96) whether he had not thought that there might be victims "Of course I did", he said, "approximately 40 bikers die on the roads each year. Let some of them die for the country."

The Greek Cypriot leadership must take ultimate responsibility for the death of the two men. They should have called off the incursion before it was too late, and should not have allowed them to cross into the UN Zone. Interviewed by the press immediately afterwards UN envoy Gustav Feissel said "It was the responsibility of the Greek Cypriot Government to ensure that the cease-fire line was not violated."

Nor should the Greek Cypriot leadership have encouraged the organisers in the first place. The Greek Orthodox Church made a large financial contribution (Alithia 28.7.96), and Archbishop Chyrisostomos declared in September on Greek Star TV "The time has come to launch a full-scale struggle against the Turks - It does not matter how much bloodshed there is or how many victims there are." Many people may be surprised by such remarks from a senior clergyman. Also, the leader of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists told Periodiko on 21st August 1996 "we were promised that the Greeks would provide transport back to Germany in a Hercules transport plane of the Greek Air Force."

Immediately after the riot, President Denkta? called upon President Clerides to meet him. He said "there is more need than ever for talks. I am ready to meet immediately, but Clerides may use the incident as an excuse not to meet." He did refuse to meet. In a letter to Clerides on 22nd September 1996 Denkta? said "It is upon us, the leaders, to tell our peoples that there is no other way in Cyprus except co-existence as good neighbours under separate roofs, or as co-founder partners under one mutually agreed bi-zonal, bi-communal roof. Rushing our borders and claiming the right to come and sweep us off our properties and demanding submission to brute force, waving Greek flags and telling us that Hellenism will be victorious in Cyprus is surely not the way to a negotiated settlement."

On 13th August 1996 the Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail wrote that "The government’s handling of the whole matter has been naïve, indecisive, and irresponsible, and quoted Clerides as saying that the bloody clashes had "given the message abroad that the two communities cannot live together, and that the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus was necessary."

On 17th August 1996 the Cyprus Mail wrote: "For some public figures, notably the Archbishop and the leader of the socialist EDEK Party these events are the heroic expression of the outrage of Greek Cypriot youth. ....The fiery rhetoric of these two public figures raises the question - are they advocating a military campaign..? Only if the answer is yes would the events have served any useful purpose.... It does not take great intelligence to conclude that the higher the tension between the two communities, and the longer the casualty list, the more remote the chances of unifying Cyprus become.... If some populist figures seek to score a few electoral points by encouraging or justifying violent protests, the elected President must refrain from mimicking their cheap slogans and their pathetic warmongering"

On 17th August 1996, according to the Greek Cypriot newspaper Simerini, new recruits to the Greek Cypriot National Guard took an oath at the Polomidhia military training centre in front of thousands of civilians that "We will drink Turkish blood. Death to the Turks." How can any international observer expect the Turkish Cypriots to live in peace with people with such a sick mentality?

On 8th September 1996 two young Turkish Cypriot national-servicemen, Privates Allahverdi Kiliç and Burhan Cihangir were shot by Kalashnikov assault rifle fire from within the buffer zone whilst on duty in their sentry box at night Pte. Kiliç died.

On 16th September 1996 at 3 am 20 shots were fired at Turkish Cypriot positions from the vicinity of the Greek Cypriot guard post at the village of Pile in the buffer zone.

On 13th October 1996 at 7.35am a Greek Cypriot violated the UN buffer zone and crossed into Northern Cyprus. He failed to stop when challenged three times by Turkish Cypriot sentries, and was shot. Examination in the presence of the UN showed that he had been carrying a commando knife and a garotte.

On 29th October 1996 at dawn two British soldiers from the Dhekelia base crossed into Northern Cyprus in a military vehicle without notice to the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Shots were fired in their direction by Turkish Cypriot sentries and they returned. There were no injuries.

On 9th December 1996 shots were fired by Turkish Cypriot sentries at two men who violated the buffer-zone in the Ayios Demetios District of Nicosia. No-one was injured.

In all probability the Greek Cypriot leadership is cynically orchestrating these border Incidents for the sake of publicity. Greek Cypriot officials generally make no secret of the way they like to see Cyprus back at the top of the news bulletins after years of seeing it overshadowed by events elsewhere (Sunday Times 12.1.97).

It is sometimes asked "If the Turkish Cypriots fear Greek and Greek Cypriot troops, are not the Greek Cypriots justified in feeling afraid of Turkish troops?" The answer is no. Turkish troops have been in Northern Cyprus since 1974, and no Turkish soldier has set foot in Southern Cyprus in that time. If Turkey had wished to occupy the whole of Cyprus she could have done so in 1974, and would never have encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to accept successive UN Plans, which would have excluded the annexation to Turkey of all or any part of Cyprus. The build up of military forces in the South serves no useful purpose, save to create tension and to undermine Turkish Cypriot confidence in the good faith of their Greek Cypriot neighbours.

It is often alleged that the UN Security Council has demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops, but this is not the case. Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) specifically called for the withdrawal of the GREEK troops to whom Makarios had referred in his letter of 2nd July 1974, but it did not, and had no legal right to, call for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, which are there under the authority of the 1960 international agreements, namely the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee.

Freedom of Movement and Settlement

From 1963 to 1974 the Turkish Cypriots begged the world to see that they were deprived of these rights by the Greek Cypriots to the point that the United Nations described them (doc. S/5950) as being under veritable siege, but the world turned a blind eye. Today, the Greek Cypriots demand that they should be free to move and to establish themselves in the Turkish Cypriot area and they claim it as a human right. The Turkish Cypriots are entitled to say to the Greek Cypriots "You did not care about our human rights when you were in control for eleven years; why should we care about yours?"

The Turkish Cypriots do not however say that, They are willing to negotiate; but unrestricted access to the North would place the personal security of Turkish Cypriots at risk again. It is all too evident in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in Europe what even a very small number of determined terrorists can do. It would also expose the Turkish Cypriots again to the risk of domination by superior numbers and greater economic power, and would create great social friction, as many of their former persecutors and their families would be instantly recognised.

Even members of the Greek Cypriot leadership understand the dangers "imagine that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots started living together in 400 villages. Wouldn’t all 400 villages be 400 sources of fire? Imagine the eruption of 400 volcanoes. If a murder was committed somewhere, the whole of Cyprus would be destroyed." (Nicos Rolandis, former Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister - CyBC Television 30.6.92).

In view of their experience from 1963 to 1974 Turkish Cypriots cannot be expected to agree to this until there is much greater confidence between the two communities. If a choice has to be made between freedom of movement and a right to live in peace, the latter must clearly prevail. President Denkta? has however made it clear that as part of an overall settlement some carefully controlled access would be permitted, but not to known terrorists.

The Greek Cypriots have always exaggerated the number of their displaced persons, and they frequently claim in excess of 200,000, but a census of evacuated Greek Cypriot dwellings in 1974 showed that there cannot possibly have been more than 105,000. This is approximately equal to the number of Turkish Cypriots who have been displaced - 25,000 in 1963 and 65,000 in 1974.

As there are only about 175,000 Turkish Cypriots, for even 100,000 Greek Cypriots to return north would make nonsense of the principle, accepted by the Greek Cypriots, that the future of Cyprus is as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Indeed, in an interview published in the "Cyprus Mail" of 23rd March 1977 Makarios said that the return of all Greek Cypriots to their former homes was out of the question, and he estimated that only about 10% would even wish to return. Nevertheless the Greek Cypriot government continues for political reasons to keep alive the hopes of former residents of the North by frequent televising of their former homes.

As long ago as 22nd May 1978 President Denkta? offered to allow the inhabitants of Varosha, a Greek Cypriot suburb of Famagusta, to return provided that the old Nicosia international airport could be reopened by the UN for the benefit of both peoples. The Greek Cypriots have consistently rejected this offer, and it was later incorporated in a set of "Confidence Building Measures" proposed by the UN Secretary General in 1993 (See below), which they also rejected.

The Turkish Cypriots do not demand the right of movement and settlement in the South, as very few of them have any desire to live among the Greek Cypriots for the foreseeable future. As for the few who did remain in the south, the Greek newspaper Ergenidiki Democratia reported in August 1991 " The police pressure and terror on Turkish Cypriots in south Cyprus constitutes only one side of the coin; the other is their living conditions. Their lives are essentially miserable. They live in old houses which generally lack electricity and water supplies, and they are often employed in manual jobs even though some are graduates."

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reported on 2nd February 1994 "There were credible reports during April that Greek Cypriot police rounded up 22 Turkish Cypriots on three separate occasions, beat them up and then "deported" them to the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area."

On 2nd June 1994 two Turkish Cypriots, Ertu_ral Akburç and Ilker Tufansoy, were shot dead in front of their homes at Stavrokonno in the South.

On 5th March 1995 Fileleftheros reported "The Turkish quarter of Limassol is a ghetto, and the people living there are third class citizens. The people there are fed up with the difficulties of life. Is this a district of co-existence or death?"

According to the US State Department report of 5th March 1996 "In November it was revealed that police in Limassol had until 1992 used torture chambers to force confessions from detainees....Police hung at least 11 victims by their feet and applied electric shocks to their genitals."

On 30th December 1996 Alithia reported the unemployment, poverty, racism, and the coercion they are being subjected to by the (Greek Cypriot) police are the reasons which are forcing Turkish Cypriots to emigrate.

By way of excuse, the Greek Cypriot side often alleges ill-treatment of the small number of Greek Cypriots who live in the North, especially on the Karpas Peninsula, but these allegations are never substantiated.

Immigration

Throughout the ages people from many different countries and faiths have settled in Cyprus. These have included Hittites, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Lusignans, Venetians, Turks, and British. There have been Greeks and Turks in Cyprus for many hundreds of years. Gradually, over the years the Turkish, and then the British rulers of the island allowed more and more Greeks to settle, so that by the time the British left in 1960 the population was 80% Greek and 20% Turkish.

Greek Cypriots complain that large numbers of people of Turkish origin have been allowed to make their homes in Northern Cyprus since 1974, but they forget that far more Turkish Cypriots emigrated to Turkey, Britain, the United States and other countries during the period 1963 to 1974 and earlier periods, when life in Cyprus was made extremely difficult for them.

During the 1963-74 period emigration of Turkish Cypriots was actively promoted, by terror, economic deprivation, and one-way assisted passages. Very little was heard from the international community about those attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration to "change the demographic structure of the island." The Greek Cypriots are still doing this in 1996 to the few Turkish Cypriots left in the South (Alithia report 30.12.96 above).

The people who have settled in Northern Cyprus since 1974 came to help rebuild the Turkish Cypriot economy from the ruins to which eleven years of persecution had reduced it, and very many of them are of Turkish Cypriot origin. It would be impossible for the Turkish Cypriot Government to introduce compulsory repatriation for such people. The Turkish Cypriots do not complain about the many thousands of Greeks, Lebanese, and others who have been allowed to settle in the South, and according to the European Commission (Com (93) 313) the Greek Cypriots are importing labour from Eastern Europe.

It is often alleged that President Denkta? owes his position to the "Turkish Settler" vote, but this is absurd. Rauf Denkta? has led the Turkish Cypriot people for forty years, and is consistently re-elected with a much higher percentage of the total votes than any other western democratic leader. In fact, at the most recent election the so-called "settlers" put up a candidate against him, who was heavily defeated.

Territory

Greek Cypriots say it is an injustice that Turkish Cypriots occupy 36.2% of the land area of the island although they are only about 20% of the population. However, there are four answers to this:

First, there is no country in the world in which each ethnic group occupies such proportion of the land area as their numbers bear to the total population, and the Greek Cypriots did not regard the equitable distribution of territory as important between 1963 and 1974. They forced the entire Turkish Cypriot population, most of whom were dependent on agriculture, to live in enclaves amounting in total to less than 3% of the land.

In Cyprus under Ottoman rule Turks and Turkish Cypriots as individuals and through their religious foundation EVKAF, owned most of the land, but Greek Cypriots were allowed to purchase land as free citizens, and by the time of independence in 1960 Turkish Cypriot holdings had reduced to about 30% of the land. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's Greek Cypriots were encouraged to buy land from Turkish Cypriots, but Greek Cypriots who contracted to sell land to Turkish Cypriots were treated as traitors by EOKA and dealt with accordingly.

In 1974 Turkish Cypriots owned large areas of vineyards in the South and they have acquired in exchange large areas of land in the North which are unsuitable for cultivation due to scarcity of water and due to salination. They have also acquired in exchange some good beaches and old hotels, but the main hotel complex at Varosha is an unusable ruin as a result of the Greek-initiated war of 1974. It is extremely difficult for Turkish Cypriots to develop their tourist industry in view of boycotts practised against them, particularly in the field of air transport, mentioned below.

Second, the area in which the Turkish Cypriots live is close to the minimum necessary to establish a defensible position and to ensure reasonable economic viability. The Turkish Cypriots did not wish to live in a divided island, and are well aware of the benefits of a larger economy, but for the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to complain about the division, having caused it to occur, is rather like a boy who kills his parents complaining about being an orphan. Trust and confidence having been destroyed, it is impossible to go back to the status quo ante.

Third, the Turkish Cypriots have, by accepting the 1986 UN draft framework agreement, agreed to negotiate territorial adjustments.

Fourth, the Turkish Cypriots have accepted that as part of an overall settlement there will be an exchange and valuation process, and compensation will be made in property and/or money to those on both sides who have lost their property.

Extradition

There are a number of persons living in Britain and other European countries who face charges in Northern Cyprus for drug trafficking and other serious offences. Similarly there are persons living in Northern Cyprus who face charges abroad. These persons could be brought to justice if Britain and the other countries concerned would enter into an extradition treaty with Northern Cyprus. They will not do so because they, wrongly, refuse to recognise Northern Cyprus as a State (see below).

Missing Persons

No human tragedy has been the subject of such blatant political exploitation as the case of missing persons in Cyprus. This issue has been a convenient, and very effective stick with which Greek Cypriots could beat Turkey before world opinion and to enlist international sympathy for themselves. For more than twenty years the Greek Cypriot government has deceived its people into thinking that their loved ones might still be alive, but in October 1995 they had to admit that not only were many of them known to be dead, but that the whereabouts of their remains were also known, and had been withheld from their families. Some were actually known to be alive. Andreas Mayas (Missing Person no. 572), is receiving a state pension.

The Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail said (27.10.95) "So now the truth is out. We are not talking about 300 dead, but 96 people killed during action in 1974 - and that is only from an initial examination of 487 files out of 1,619 in the Attorney-General’s office.... Successive governments have a lot to answer for. Why were those put on the list of missing people in the first place?"

On 3rd March 1996 the Cyprus Mail wrote: "Subsequent (Greek) Cypriot governments have found it convenient to conceal the scale of atrocities during the coup in an attempt to downplay its contribution to the tragedy of the summer of 1974 and instead blame the Turkish invasion for all casualties. There can be no justification for any government that failed to investigate this sensitive humanitarian issue. The shocking admission by the Clerides government that there are people buried in Nicosia cemetery who are still included in the list of the "missing" is the last episode of a human drama which has been turned into a propaganda tool."

On 19th October 1996 Mr. George Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the Foreign Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London......I deeply apologise to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing persons. I misled them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the Government of Cyprus......Now it seems that the credibility of Cyprus is nil."

Greek Cypriot Missing Persons

For Greek Cypriots, their loved ones went missing from 15th July 1974 when, as noted above, Greek Cypriot paramilitaries backed by mainland Greek troops overthrew the Makarios Government and began to slaughter any Greek Cypriot suspected of being a supporter of Makarios, before turning their attention to Turkish Cypriots.

On 17th April 1991 Ambassador Nelson Ledsky testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "Most of the missing persons disappeared in the first days of July 1974 (ie before the Turkish intervention on the 20th). Many killed on the Greek side were killed by Greek Cypriots and in fighting between supporters of Makarios and Sampson."

On 19th July 1974, before the Turkish army landed, Archbishop Makarios told the UN Security Council "I do not yet know the details of the Cyprus crisis caused by the Greek military regime. I am afraid that the number of losses is great..... I considered the danger from Turkey lesser than the danger from Greek army officers."

The Greek newspaper TA NEA published an interview on 28th February 1976 with Father Papatsestos, the Greek Orthodox priest in charge of the Nicosia cemetery. He recounted the events of 17th July 1974 when Greek officers required him to bury truckloads of Greek Cypriots in mass graves, together with one young Greek Cypriot whom they buried alive, and ten dead Turkish Cypriots. This one priest counted at least 127 bodies brought to him, and there must have been many similar incidents throughout the island.

On 22nd July 1974 The Times reported that "a production Director from Dublin said he had seen bodies being buried in a mass grave near Paphos after last Monday's coup. People were told by Makarios to lay down their guns and were shot out of hand by the National Guard, he said."

On 23rd July 1974 The Times reported "Fears that many supporters of Archbishop Makarios may have been massacred since the last week's coup were expressed in London yesterday, by an American-born woman whose husband is now on top of EOKA-B's wanted list. She was told that about a hundred members of the Presidential Palace guard had been killed after they laid down their arms. Although Nicos Sampson claimed that since the coup no one had been killed or tortured while in custody, she had heard differently. According to very reliable sources, EOKA and the Greek officered Greek Cypriot National Guard were not taking prisoners and was told by trusted sources that those they hated were being killed on capture."

On 6th November 1974 TA NEA reported the erasure of dates from the graves of Greek Cypriots killed in the five days 15th - 20th July, in order to blame their deaths on the subsequent Turkish military action.

In an article on 28th February 1976 in the Greek Cypriot press Father Papatsestos said: "It is a rather hard thing to say, but it is true that the Turkish intervention saved us from a merciless internecine war. The Sampson regime had prepared a list of all Makarios supporters, and they would have slaughtered them all." Many of the people saved by Turkey are members of the present Greek Cypriot leadership.

During the fighting with Turkish troops between 20th July and 16th August 1974 many Greek Cypriots died in combat. So far as possible their bodies were recovered and identified by Turkish forces. There were very few deaths of Greek Cypriot civilians.

The balance of probabilities is therefore that of those Greek Cypriots still listed as missing most were killed during the Sampson coup of 15th - 20th July 1974, and that others died in combat. Some are in mass graves such as those described by Father Papatsestos, and the remainder have no known grave. Those killed in the fighting with the Turkish army would not have died if the Greek Cypriots and Greece had not tried to exterminate the Turkish Cypriots and annex the island to Greece, and the blame for their deaths must rest firmly upon their own leadership.

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of War taken by the Turkish Army were sent to Turkey, where they were visited by the Red Cross, and repatriated on 8th August 1974, 16th September 1974, and 28th October 1975 under international supervision. There are no prisoners of war still in Turkey. Until recently however allegations continued to made of "sightings" of Greek or Greek Cypriots in Turkey, and sometimes photographs were produced.

On 17th April 1991 US Ambassador Ledsky told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "The US Ambassador to Turkey has looked into all of these allegations and found there was no substance. The Turkish Government was cooperative and the Turkish and US Governments worked together on this. The subject has been exhausted and we haven't even heard an allegation in two years."

On 5th March 1996, US Ambassador Ledsky reiterated that there is no evidence that any of the missing persons is still alive.

Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons

The Turkish Cypriots have at least as much interest as the Greek Cypriots in finding out what happened to members of their families who are missing. However, most Turkish Cypriots have now concluded that they are dead and will never be seen again.

For Turkish Cypriots, their sense of bereavement goes back at least as far as Christmas 1963 when, as noted above, the numerically superior Greek Cypriots made a violent attack upon the Turkish Cypriot civilian population. This was not war, but a premeditated attack upon defenceless women, children and old men. The attacks were repeated in 1967 and again in 1974.

There are 803 Turkish Cypriot missing persons. A number of mass graves have been found, upon which memorials have been built, but many of these Turkish Cypriots have no known grave. Their families have been encouraged by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to accept the inevitable conclusion that they are dead and to put their grief behind them.

Efforts to trace Missing Persons

The Committee on Missing persons, comprising a Turkish Cypriot, a Greek Cypriot, and a Swiss member appointed by the UN Secretary-General and representing the Red Cross, was established in July 1981. 169 cases have been submitted to them from both sides and the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish authorities have given their full cooperation.

However, in a letter dated 18th July 1988 from the then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, to Mr. Charles Glass, Sir Geoffrey said "One stumbling block we know the Chairman has encountered is the Greek Cypriot insistence on physical evidence of the death of individuals. Unfortunately this is simply not available so long after the event. Unless this problem can be resolved in some way, it is likely that the Committee will report that no agreed conclusions are possible."

The Greek Cypriot leadership still tries to keep alive the question of missing persons as a political weapon against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Their insistence, after more than 20 years, on the production of a live or dead body before they will consider a case closed, makes it very doubtful that they have any genuine interest in assisting the Committee on Missing Persons to complete its work.

X ATTEMPTS AT SETTLEMENT

Since 1968 attempts have been made to negotiate an agreement pursuant to which the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could be united under some kind of constitution for the whole island.

The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denkta?, a London-trained barrister, has been a member of the Turkish Cypriot leadership since the early 1950s. He became leader after Dr. Küçük in 1972 and has been consistently elected by the Turkish Cypriots as their leader and now their President. He has since then negotiated with Makarios, Clerides, Kyprianou, Vassiliou, and now Clerides again as successive leaders of the Greek Cypriots.

Denkta? is described by Mr. Michael Dekleris, the Greek constitutional expert, as follows: "When I knew him he was a realist, a moderate man at the negotiating table. His attitude was of a man who seriously wanted and pursued an agreement. I negotiated with him for two and a half years, and during that period I can say that he behaved in a responsible and moderate manner." (Fileleftheros 6.10.96).

On 8th June 1972 Rauf Denkta? made the following statement at the opening of the inter-communal talks:

"The area in which Cyprus is located is highly sensitive; the inseparable ties of the two communities with their motherlands are too strong to be denied; the fact that whatever happens between the two communities is inevitably reflected in Ankara and Athens cannot be disregarded. We therefore, as the two national communities, the co-founders of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus... have a duty not only to our respective communities and to Cyprus as a whole, but also an international duty of maintaining the peace in this delicate area, in the knowledge that by so doing we help our motherlands to normalise their political relations. Cyprus should be and can be made a bridge of Greco-Turkish friendship and cooperation and our role to this end can be most significant."

In 1977 Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denkta? agreed that they were not seeking a return to the 1960 Constitution, but envisaged a bi-communal federal republic in which each community would have territory under its own administration. Makarios died in 1977, and in 1979 Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denkta? affirmed that agreement. It is on that basis that all subsequent talks under UN auspices have taken place.

However, the main obstacle to progress appears to have been the lack of political will on the part of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to put these agreements into effect. On 17th March 1965 Makarios said "We shall keep the Cyprus question open and will never close it under any circumstances or conditions ...... until we close it through union with Greece." Indeed, on 24th November 1983 the Greek Prime Minister said "We can only negotiate for a unitary Cyprus. For us neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution. Our proposal is for the establishment of a unitary State. We can negotiate on this after the departure of the Turkish soldiers" ("Ethnos" 24.11.83).

As noted above, Cyprus never was a unitary state, and no Turkish Cypriot leader could accept such a state, in which the Greek Cypriots could again use their superior numbers to control the whole island. This would put the Turkish Cypriots back into the impossible position they were in from 1963 to 1974. Even more important is the Greek and Greek Cypriot insistence that Turkish troops leave the island, for this would leave the Greek Cypriots free to renege again on whatever constitution they had agreed, and to resort to violence again, just as they did in 1963, in 1967, and in 1974.

Of course, no one can be certain what the Greek Cypriots would do, but the Turkish Cypriots cannot be expected by others, whose families would not be in danger, to take that risk.

United Nations Plans

In November 1984, after lengthy discussions with both sides the then UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, put forward a draft framework agreement for a comprehensive solution of the problem through the establishment of a federal republic. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan in its entirety but Kyprianou, after consulting Athens, said he could accept it only as a basis for discussion. This announcement surprised even his own people, and a motion of censure upon him was passed in the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives.

During the debate Mr. Ezekias Papaioannou, leader of the AKEL Party said: "Kyprianou never adopted the basis of federation which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denkta?, and he never exerted any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. He never respected the summit agreements." Mr. Glafcos Clerides, then leader of the Democratic Rally Party and now President of Southern Cyprus, said: "Kyprianou asked for the renegotiation of everything from A to Z. He should not have brought forth again issues which had already been debated and agreed upon with Denkta?."

In April 1985, the Secretary-General put forward an amended version of his plan, which was accepted by the Greek Cypriots. This document had not however been discussed with both sides and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it.

In March 1986, after further discussions, this time with both sides, the Secretary-General put forward a new draft framework agreement, which again envisaged a federal solution. This document was again accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in its entirety. The Greek Cypriots replied that before they would even express their views upon it there must be agreement on withdrawal of Turkish troops, and civilians who had come to Cyprus since July 1974, "effective international guarantees, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property". They proposed an "International conference", (which had been suggested first by the Soviet Union) or a "high level meeting".

When he had presented his plan the Secretary-General made it clear (UN doc. S/18102/Add.1, para. 6) that it "preserved all the points on which agreement had been achieved since August 1984 . . ., suggested solutions to the remaining divergencies in a manner that in my judgment protected the interests of both communities, and proposed procedures for negotiation of the outstanding issues which remained to be tackled, including withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, guarantees, and freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property".

Response to Greek Cypriot Rejection of 1986 UN Plan

On 29th May 1987 the Secretary General reiterated "that the procedures proposed in the draft framework agreement had provided each side with every opportunity to ensure that the negotiations proceeded in a manner that took full account of their concerns and that the concept of an integrated whole meant that the parties' ultimate commitment to an overall solution would depend on the resolution of all issues to their mutual satisfaction".

On 23rd October 1987 in the House of Commons the British Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs said "We continue to believe that the proposals form a good basis for settlement and we urge their acceptance even now. We believe that the proposals took account of both the internal and international aspects of the Cyprus problem. They were put forward on the basis that acceptance of each part depended on the acceptance of the whole". (Hansard col. 1110).

However, the Greek Cypriots persisted in their demand that the issues which were important to them be isolated and dealt with as a precondition. They were thereby seeking to take the benefits of the Secretary-General's initiative without making any concessions.

Even Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis, later to be Prime Minister of Greece, said that withdrawal of Turkish troops should be seen as the result of a settlement not the precondition for one.

On 14th June 1986 The Times reported that "the UN Secretary- General had cast his usual diplomatic discretion aside to blame the Greek Cypriot community for obstructing his attempts at a negotiated solution to the Cyprus dispute ... The warning was a rare concerted public effort to bring home the message to the Greek Cypriots that time was not on their side. With the Turkish Cypriots having firmly placed themselves in the right by accepting the UN package the door was open for further consolidation of their Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".

The Times continued "It was also a deliberate effort to make it as difficult as possible for Mr. Kyprianou to continue side-stepping the package in the hope of seeing it fade into obscurity". Unfortunately the Greek Cypriots have indeed been permitted to continue side-stepping the package without any real diplomatic costs, and are still holding out for better terms.

To say, as some countries do, that they will never recognise two states in Cyprus means that the Greek Cypriots can be as inflexible as they like and can prolong the political uncertainty for the Turkish Cypriots indefinitely.

The two sides have a fundamentally different approach to the negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots accept the reality that the 1960 constitution has been destroyed, that the two peoples have lived apart since 1963 and have occupied their present territory for many years, that people on both sides have adjusted to their new environment and have been getting on constructively with their lives since then. They see the two political entities as negotiating together as equals to form a new political association acceptable to them both.

The Greek Cypriot leadership on the other hand have been misled by world acceptance of their own assertions into thinking that they are indeed the legitimate government of all Cyprus, and that they are dealing with a "rebellious minority" who have to be brought back under their authority. It is most unlikely that they will agree, except as another paper commitment, to anything which would exclude forever the possibility of Greek Cypriot control of all Cyprus or annexation to Greece.

Since these two fundamentally different approaches are most unlikely to be reconciled there is little prospect for an agreement. As noted above, the Greek Orthodox Church is very strong in Cyprus, and it is almost impossible for the secular leadership to take any action of which the church leaders strongly disapprove. It is an article of religious faith for them that the island be annexed to Greece, and any proposed settlement which did not leave this possibility open would almost certainly be rejected by them. Any settlement which left intact an effective Turkish military guarantee would of course exclude that possibility.

Church leaders should however remember that on Independence Day 1985 the Greek Cypriot Daily "Simerini" lamented as follows: "We believed that we were the centre of the Earth. We thought that we, small and insignificant as we are, would be capable of exercising policy on an intercontinental plane. But also above all we underestimated the Turks. The unstable and fickle policy of our leaders has brought us to the brink of total disaster."

In February 1988 the Greek Cypriots elected a new leader, Mr. George Vassiliou who, it was hoped, would bring a fresh approach to the whole matter. The Turkish Cypriots hoped that Mr. Vassiliou would be able to accept the basis for settlement outlined in the 1986 UN plan, and they hoped that he would adopt a more constructive approach than his predecessor Mr. Kyprianou. They were disappointed.

In March 1988 President Denkta? invited the newly elected leader for an informal social meeting with him, and proposed a comprehensive programme of confidence-building measures in the social, cultural, medical, environmental, educational, and other fields. The informal meeting never occurred because Mr. Vassiliou insisted that it take place at the "Presidential Palace" in South Nicosia with his participation as "President" of all Cyprus. Likewise the confidence building measures foundered on the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to deal with the corresponding Turkish Cypriot institutions on a basis of equality.

Mr. Vassiliou hoped that the Turkish Cypriots could be persuaded to make more concessions than even the 1986 plan contained, and he made maximum use of all the diplomatic advantages which as the "Government of Cyprus" he possessed, to create international pressure. In particular, he enlisted the aid of Greece to use its position as a member of the European [Union] to bring pressure to bear upon Turkey to put its own aspiration to join the Union before its moral and Treaty obligations toward the Turkish Cypriots. He took full advantage of the fact that Turkey, having no voice in the Union, could not participate in the policy-making process.

1988-90 Talks

From 1st November 1988 the Turkish Cypriots presented 12 papers setting out their detailed proposals. On 30th January 1989 the Greek Cypriots submitted a paper containing their outline proposals for a settlement, but this paper did not even mention the Turkish Cypriot proposals.

Whilst the Greek Cypriot proposals were outwardly reasonable, and contained many paper commitments for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, it was clear that the Greek Cypriots were still unwilling to agree to anything which would close the door in substance upon their ambition to dominate the island again and/or to annex it to Greece. In particular, they continued to seek to undermine the Turkish military guarantee, in the absence of which any new agreement would be worth no more than the agreement which the Greek Cypriots tore up in 1963.

The Turkish Cypriots submitted their written response to this paper on 13th February 1989. In February 1990 the two leaders met with the UN Secretary-General at New York. In his statement of 2nd March the Secretary General made it clear that the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was not one of majority and minority, and that any solution must be decided upon by, and acceptable to, both of them. See also his "set of ideas" 21.8.1992 para. 3).

The talks broke down because, despite the Secretary-General's statement, the Greek Cypriots refused to accept that the Turkish Cypriots had the right of self-determination. This is contrary to common sense, because a worthwhile agreement is not an abstract thing, it is a consensus which must be freely reached and which both parties must genuinely wish to put into effect. The Greek Cypriots are also wrong in law, for in detailed written opinions two of the world's leading international lawyers, Mr. Eli Lauterpacht QC of the UK and Mr. Monroe Leigh of the US confirmed in 1990 that each of the two parties do indeed have the right of self-determination.

The Greek Orthodox Church is very powerful in Southern Cyprus. For the foreseeable future it is most unlikely to allow any secular leader to sign an agreement which would exclude forever the chance to regain control over the whole of Cyprus and unite it to "Holy Mother Greece."

On 12th March 1990 the UN Security Council passed resolution 649 which stressed that any solution must be reached freely and must be mutually acceptable, and called upon the two leaders to cooperate on an equal footing with the Secretary- General. This is perhaps the first UN resolution on Cyprus to be based on reality; it is fair to both sides, and does not refer to the Greek Cypriots as "the Government of Cyprus."

Following the New York meeting President Denkta? resigned, so as to submit his policy to the judgement of the Turkish Cypriot electorate. On 24th April 1990 he was re-elected with 66.7% of the vote on a 93% turnout.

An International Conference?

On 8th June 1991 the Greek Cypriots reverted to the demand which they made in 1986 that there should be a multi-party international conference. They proposed a nine member conference, but had the audacity to suggest that they (as the "Government of Cyprus") should be a party to the conference whilst the Turkish Cypriots should only attend from time to time as "consultants," together with representatives of the Greek Cypriot "community." This proposal was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

In August 1991 US President George Bush proposed a four party conference under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, which had first been proposed by President Özal of Turkey in 1990. The participants would be Turkey, Greece, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriots. This arrangement acknowledges the realities of Cyprus and accords equal status to all the parties most intimately concerned, but the conference was never convened.

The UN Initiatives of 1992/94

In June 1992 the new Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, invited the two leaders to New York for discussions on a "set of ideas" for an overall settlement, which he had devised (UN doc. S/24472 annx.). A protracted series of meetings ensued, but in November 1992 the Secretary-General admitted that there was a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides, and that it was necessary to try to build some confidence before any further progress could be made.

In early 1993 there were Presidential elections in Southern Cyprus, and Mr. Glafcos Clerides was elected. On 1st July 1993 (UN doc. S/26026) the Secretary General proposed a set of 14 "confidence building measures" of which the two most important were the reopening of Nicosia International Airport (NIA) so that the Turkish Cypriots would have direct air access to the outside world; and the reopening for occupation by Greek Cypriots, and commercial activity by both sides, of the fenced-off area of the Famagusta suburb of Varosha (about 4km x 1.5km), which had been deserted since July 1974.

The Turkish Cypriots considered that only a complete removal of the Greek Cypriot economic embargo would be a sufficient quid pro quo for the handover of Varosha; and that the area of Varosha north of Dhimokratias Street should remain as a security buffer zone to protect the port area. They were however persuaded to withdraw these objections, and on 15th February 1994 the two leaders committed themselves to intensive discussions on the implementation of the UN package. The Secretary-General noted (S/26026 para. 50) that Turkey had expressed public support for the package and encouraged its acceptance. However, the Greek Cypriot daily "Eleftherotipia" reported on 7th February that the Greek Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, had voiced clear opposition to the CBMs, saying that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots had any intention to negotiate the CBMs to the end.

It is surprising that the Turkish Cypriots were willing to accept this package, because they were being asked to hand over actual territory in return for little more than a hope that after 12 months or more, their passengers and cargoes would be able to fly unhindered to other countries. There were no guarantees of traffic rights or of admission to those other countries - merely a promise by the UN to "use their best endeavours." Nor was there any guarantee that the airport would not be closed by terrorist activity, and there was no residual right in that event to use a secure airport in the North with the same traffic rights.

Nevertheless the Turkish Cypriots did accept the package, but to their astonishment they were then presented by the UN on 21st March 1994 with a set of "draft ideas" which differed in several very important respects, to the advantage of the Greek Cypriots, from the package to which the Turkish Cypriots had agreed. The Greek Cypriots accepted this "non-paper" with alacrity, and declared that they would accept no departure whatsoever from it.

The main differences were as follows:

Varosha

The package was extended to include in effect a zone to the south of the fenced-off area, which was comparable in size to the whole of that area. In that zone the Turkish Cypriots were required not only to allow unhindered passage between the fenced-off area and the north-south border buffer-zone, but to hand over control of the whole zone to the UN. (As to the inability of the UN to control the buffer-zone See Recent Border Incidents above).

Nicosia International Airport

The original package (para. 43) had provided that traffic rights at the airport would be limited to foreign airlines (ie including airlines registered in Turkey, but excluding the Greek Cypriot "Cyprus Airways" which already enjoys full international traffic rights from Larnaca airport). The altered package included the Greek Cypriot airline; an alteration with important commercial consequences.

The original package did not place any restriction on the number of airlines registered in Turkey which would be allowed to use NIA. The altered package limited the number to "an agreed number"

The original package did not deprive either side of its right to collect customs duties. The altered package transferred that right to the UN.

When they saw the altered package the Turkish Cypriots were dismayed. Such confidence as they had in the UN was undermined, and many among them advocated their complete withdrawal from the whole UN process. Nevertheless President Denkta? with the support of Turkey maintained contact with the UN Special Representative and with the American Ambassador, Robert Lamb, in an effort to salvage something. There was in particular a meeting in Vienna on 11/12th May 1994 at the initiative of the United States and attended by the UN Deputy Special Representative.

After lengthy discussions, the Turkish Cypriots eventually agreed to accept substantial alterations of the original package, including the UN map defining the area of Varosha to be handed over, and alterations relating to access to and from the fenced area of Varosha, and the use of NIA by "Cyprus Airways." They communicated their acceptance by telegram to the UN on 1st June 1994.

The Secretary-General knew of the progress of these discussions, and yet at 7.30 pm on the evening before, he released a report (dated 30th May) which made no mention of them, and blamed President Denkta? for causing a breakdown of the talks. This report had a profound effect on public opinion in Northern Cyprus. In fact the cause of the breakdown was the alteration of the 1st July package, and the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to negotiate any amendment of the altered package. The initiative of the Secretary-General was intended to build confidence between the two parties, but its result has been to undermine such confidence as the parties had in each other, and to bring the United Nations even further into disrepute among the Turkish Cypriot people.

In the face of the Turkish Cypriot acceptance, the Secretary-General was obliged to resile from his previous position, and to acknowledge in his letter of 28th June that the subsequent talks with the Turkish Cypriot leader between 6th and 16th June 1994 had "registered considerable progress toward agreement on the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures." He took the view that "there had now been sufficient progress for the UN to implement the package on the basis of the 21st March paper and subsequent clarifications."

The Turkish Cypriots quite reasonably insisted that the verbal assurances given to them be incorporated in the text of the 21st March paper, but both the Secretary-General and the Greek Cypriots refused to do so. The Secretary General then passed the matter to the Security Council with the suggestion that it consider the options for the future contained in his report dated 30th May.

One of the options (para. 58) was to adopt coercive measures against one of the parties "in order to compel it to be more flexible and cooperative in negotiations on the question of confidence building measures." Rarely in the annals of the United Nations can there have been a more foolish recommendation from the Secretary-General. How can one possibly build confidence by coercion? Moreover, since the purpose of confidence-building measures is to facilitate an overall agreement which, according to the Secretary-General himself (S/24472), would have to be endorsed by a separate referendum in each part of the island, how can anyone believe that people would willingly vote for a settlement imposed upon them by coercion?

Another option (para. 57) was "to conclude that, after 30 years of endeavour, it has become evident that the political will for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute simply does not exist, and that the scarce peacemaking and peacekeeping resources of the United Nations should be redirected to other disputes and conflicts where there might be a greater chance of success."

Dr. Hugo Gobbi, a former Special Representative in Cyprus of the UN Secretary-General has concluded that the solution should be two associated Republics (Rethinking Cyprus 1993 p 85).

This is a much more sensible option, because the solution to the Cyprus question is not just a matter of finding the right form of words. The reality seems to be that the Greek Cypriots have no political will to reach a negotiated settlement. They prefer to keep their unjustified international status as the government of all Cyprus - and to continue their efforts to persuade the international community to force the Turkish Cypriots into submission.

This became quite clear when President Denkta? and President Clerides met for direct talks in October 1994. Following the talks President Denkta? wrote to the Secretary General (UN doc. A/49/685; S/1994/1330) on 21st November 1994 and said "I wish to confirm that I am prepared and willing to sign the confidence-building measures agreement; that I believe that the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreement would help in facilitating an overall solution; that we are fully committed to a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal solution; and that I am always available and prepared to engage in face to face negotiations with Mr. Clerides. The Turkish Cypriot side does have the political will and readiness to reach a negotiated settlement with the Greek Cypriot side and to bring an equitable solution and lasting peace to both peoples of our beautiful island."

The Greek Cypriots have refused to have any further discussions with the Turkish Cypriots- on one occasion rejecting initiatives from President Denkta? on the absurd ground that they were written on the wrong letter heading! It is clear that they now see membership of the European Union and a build-up of military might, instead of negotiation, as the way to secure their objective.

Mr. Glafcos Clerides, has made it clear that his policy is "based on rearmament, military cooperation with Greece, and the exertion of pressure on Turkey through EU membership." (Fileleftheros 7.12.96). However, in his memoirs My Deposition at p.366 he had expressed the wiser view that "we still continue to hold views that are unrealistic. Some of us dream a false dream and advocate that it is possible by arming ourselves, by obtaining other than conventional weapons, to change the balance of power in our favour."

Mr. Gerasimos Arsenis, former Greek Minister of Defence has said: "Hellenism is getting stronger each day and will be victorious by the end of the century." (Alithia 31.7.95)

In May 1995 meetings were held in London between officials from both sides, but the Greek Cypriot side demanded that the Turkish Cypriots concede membership of the EU as a precondition to further talks. On 6th December 1995 the Turkish Cypriots tried again, and drafted a further offer of talks, with the assistance of US Presidential Envoy Richard Beattie. They were rejected by the Greek Cypriots.

XI THE PRESENT SITUATION

International Relations

At the present time, the world recognises the Greek Cypriots as the Government of Cyprus, though they plainly do not represent the Turkish Cypriots, and they have themselves destroyed the 1960 Constitution which was the legal basis of that Government. "Cyprus" Ambassadors and High Commissioners are all Greek Cypriots, they occupy the Cyprus chair at the United Nations, at Commonwealth meetings, and at meetings of all the major international organisations.

"From 1964 to the present, the Greek Cypriot regime has claimed to be the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, with sovereign rights over the whole island and all its inhabitants. There is no legal basis in international law for such a claim." (Monroe Leigh op. cit.).

It is hardly surprising that almost all international proceedings and personal contacts on the Cyprus question are one-sided, and this must impair the authority and essential validity of the numerous General Assembly, Security Council, and other resolutions which the Greek Cypriots so often use in support of their case. Likewise, in the Institutions of the European Union the Greek representative consistently argues the Greek Cypriot case, but the Turkish Cypriot case is seldom heard.

The Commons Select Committee recommended in July 1987 that "whatever the prospects for an early federal settlement the British Government and others must recognise the need to release Northern Cyprus from its present "pariah" status, and that everything possible should be done to facilitate contacts between Northern Cyprus and the outside world". However, the Greek Cypriots have so far prevented the implementation of the Committee's recommendation.

Economic Embargo

The Greek Cypriots have used their unwarranted status as the Government of Cyprus to persuade the world to practise a partial but very damaging economic embargo against the Turkish Cypriots. These "sanctions" do not have the authority of any UN Security Council Resolution under Article 41 of the Charter..

Most of the international trade and investment still goes to the Greek Cypriot South, and the Turkish Cypriots are still placed at an enormous disadvantage by absence of diplomatic relations. They not unnaturally regard this as a serious injustice, and they ought not to be expected to endure it any longer. The House of Commons Select Committee recommended in July 1987 that:

(i) Normal postal and telephone services should be restored between north and south Cyprus and between north Cyprus and the outside world.

(ii) International commercial air services should be permitted to the North.

(iii) Ships' Masters who use harbours in the north should not be subjected to threats of legal penalties in the South.

Very little has been done, save that telephone numbers in Northern Cyprus are now obtainable from International Directory Enquiries, and some of the main travel agents have ceased to discriminate against Northern Cyprus. Airlines are able to fly from Britain and other European countries to Northern Cyprus but the international requirement for a stopover (but without changing planes) in Turkey increases the time and cost of the flight.

The Greek Cypriots have also succeeded in constructing an international embargo against the participation of Turkish Cypriot Sporting Clubs in international events. This is a petty attitude which does nothing to foster trust and confidence between the two peoples of Cyprus, and should be abandoned forthwith.

These boycotts were intended to force the Turkish Cypriots to concede Greek Cypriot demands, but they have served only to drive the Turkish Cypriots closer than ever to Turkey.

On 5th July 1994 the European Court of Justice (Case C-432/92) gave judgement in an action initiated by the Greek Cypriots in the English courts. They held that member states of the EU could not import fruit and vegetables from Northern Cyprus without a certificate issued by the Greek Cypriot authorities. They came to this conclusion simply because the member states of the EU recognise the Greek Cypriots as the only government of all Cyprus.

The Court brushed aside the argument of the Commission and the British Government that the Greek Cypriots would never grant certificates to Turkish Cypriot producers, and that to require such certificates would be to discriminate against the Turkish Cypriots in violation of Article 5 of the EU-Cyprus Association Agreement 1972. The Commission had made it clear that in its view a policy of non-recognition should not deprive the people of Cyprus of any advantages conferred by the Agreement.

This case is a further example of the power which recognition gives the illegal Greek Cypriot administration, and is further evidence that they have no desire to build confidence between the two communities.

The foolishness of the Greek Cypriot action was recognised in "Alithia" a pro-government newspaper published in Southern Cyprus. On 17th July 1994, they wrote:

"the chance of reaching a solution hasn't increased following this court decision. If anything has increased it is the dependence of the North on Turkey. It should not be forgotten that before 1974 the Turkish Cypriots lived through a period many times worse than this and survived. Then, as today, we the Greek Cypriots had empty hopes due to the economic deprivation of the Turkish Cypriots and thought that they would melt with the economic problems they faced.

We caused the Turkish invasion by exerting pressure on the Turkish Cypriots before 1974. After 1974 we decided to exert more pressure. We imposed on them an economic embargo. We entertained the hope that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would collapse. The consequence of this has been the deepening of the gap between the two communities, and we have forced the Turkish Cypriots closer to Turkey."

Travel Between North and South

Tourists arriving in Cyprus through a Northern port or airport are permitted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to cross into the South for as long as they like, and may leave through a Southern port or airport. However, the Greek Cypriots will not allow them to cross into the South.

Tourists who arrive in Cyprus through a Southern port or airport are allowed by the Turkish Cypriots to cross into the North provided they complete the same entrance formalities as are usual at borders. However, the Greek Cypriots insist that the tourists return before 5pm on the same day. They station people at the crossing point to accost travellers and tell them that the North is an armed camp, where their safety and health cannot be guaranteed. This is of course ridiculous, as is well known by the very many members of Parliament, businessmen and holiday makers who visit Northern Cyprus every year. The Greek Cypriot authorities are naturally anxious lest foreign visitors find out for themselves that the stories they have been told in the South are propaganda.

Postal Services

Any letter or parcel for an address in Cyprus will be delivered to the Greek Cypriots in the South, where items destined for Northern Cyprus are often destroyed or "lost." It is therefore necessary for items for Northern Cyprus to be addressed via Mersin 10, Turkey.

Tourism

As already noted, the Greek Cypriots do their best to frighten people from taking holidays in Northern Cyprus by giving a false picture of the situation there, and by seeking to intimidate travel agents booking hotels there with threats of legal action which they well know, after the Hesperides Hotels case (see below), would fail. Persons acting in the Greek Cypriot cause even threatened the London Underground with a bomb attack in 1990 if they did not remove posters advertising holidays in Northern Cyprus.

Today, Northern Cyprus is a thriving holiday resort, where there is hardly any crime, and where the beaches and scenery have not been spoilt by modern development. There are daily flights from most countries, via Turkey.

Property

Pending a settlement, Turkish Cypriot properties in the South are occupied by Greek Cypriots, and vice versa. If a settlement is reached compensation would be paid to all who lost their property, and the Greek Cypriots are therefore delaying this. There is a lot of talk in international circles about Greek Cypriot hotels occupied in the North, but very little about Turkish Cypriot farms and vineyards occupied in the South.

The Hesperides Hotels Case

The dispute relating to former Greek Cypriot properties in the North came before the English courts in Hesperides Hotels v Aegean Turkish Holidays & Müftüzade [1978] QB 205. Giving judgement in the Court of Appeal Lord Denning said:

"There is an effective administration in Northern Cyprus which has made laws governing the day to day lives of the people. According to these laws the people who have occupied these hotels in Kyrenia are not trespassers. They are not occupying them unlawfully. ... It follows inexorably that their conduct cannot be made the subject of a suit in England."

The case went to the House of Lords, but the only point on which the House disagreed with the Court of Appeal related to the furniture of the hotels. This was not pursued, and is no longer of any consequence since the furniture would now be at least 22 years old and the hotels have been re-equipped.

The Loizidou Case

In 1996 the Greek Cypriots secured a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the court brought itself into disrepute. The case of Loizidou v Turkey, (18.12.96) is a good example of the superficial nature of its proceedings, and its inability to refrain from meddling in areas where it does more harm than good.

The court (an organ of the Council of Europe, not of the EU) decided under Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights that the rights of Mrs. Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot living in Southern Cyprus, had been violated because since 1974 she had not been allowed to exercise control over a piece of land at Kyrenia in Northern Cyprus, which she owned in 1974 and claimed still to own. The European Commission on Human Rights (15318/89 para. 101) had held that there was no such violation.

The perversity of the Loizidou case is that Turkey, being the only one of the three guarantor powers to discharge its treaty obligations in 1974, is now exposed to the payment of millions of dollars in compensation to Greek Cypriots whose misfortune was actually caused by the incomparably more serious violation from 1963 to 1974, by members of their own community, of the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Not one of the victims of those racist attacks has ever received compensation for the violation of their human rights. By comparison Mrs. Loizidou’s property rights seem trivial.

All this was ignored by the European Court of Human Rights, for whom everything which happened before 20th July 1974 appears to be irrelevant.

If the Court of Human Rights had examined the facts of the period 1960 - 1974 they would have come to a different conclusion as to the responsibility for the existence of the border between north and south, the legal and moral right of the Turkish Cypriots to establish their own state, to appropriate Greek Cypriot property for the resettlement of refugees, and to deny Greek Cypriots access to the North.

The dissenting judgements show clearly the error into which the Court fell.

Judge Jambrek (Slovenia) said "It seems beyond this court’s abilities and competence to assess with the required certainty whether Turkey’s interference [in Cyprus] was inconsistent with international agreements, and whether or not it was inconsistent with general principles of international law."

Judge Pettiti (France) said: "The United Nations not having designated Turkey’s intervention as aggression in the international law sense, negotiations have been conducted with a view to mediation. The court did not examine the question whether that intervention was lawful."

The majority members of the court held Turkey responsible because there have since 1974 been large numbers of Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus with which Turkey could if it wished control everything which happens there. They did not consider it necessary to enquire why those troops were in Cyprus and whether Turkey did in fact exercise such control. The NATO countries have had large numbers of troops in Germany for most of the time since the formation of the Federal Republic, but they have never sought to interfere with the German government and no-one has suggested that they were responsible in law for its acts.

The logic of the court’s judgement means that if Turkey is to be held responsible in law she would have to take control of the democratic government which the Turkish Cypriots have elected, and interfere in questions of land ownership and other matters of day to day government in Northern Cyprus. Turkey acted in 1974 to guarantee the rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots, not to abrogate them. Turkish soldiers died in 1974 to protect the Turkish Cypriots from aggression, not to rule them. Such denial of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots is what the Greek Cypriots have been trying to achieve since 1963.

Greek Cypriot Defiance of the United Nations

Further, the court ignored the fact that the buffer zone between south and north is controlled by United Nations troops, not by Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, and that by entering illegally into that zone in 1989, in an attempt to break through to Kyrenia, the applicant Mrs. Loizidou, was defying the United Nations. As noted above, (Recent Border Incidents) this was not an isolated case.

In their dissenting judgements the Vice-President of the Court, Judge Bernhardt (Germany), and Judge Lopes Rocha (Portugal), said "it is impossible to separate the individual victim from a complex historical development and a no less complex current situation............ The case of Mrs. Loizidou is not the consequence of an individual act of Turkish troops directed against her property or her freedom of movement, but the consequence of the establishment of the border line in 1974 and its closure up to the present day."

Judge Pettiti (France) in another dissenting judgement said: "The decision to station international forces on the line...made the free movement of persons between the two zones impossible, and responsibility for that does not rest with the Turkish Government alone."

The court sought to draw a distinction between allowing Greek Cypriots physical access to their former properties and restoring to them effective control over those properties. Even if the latter approach is adopted, it is totally unrealistic for the court to expect either community to change the control of thousands of properties as an isolated act. The control of properties in both parts of Cyprus, and compensation of their former owners is fundamental to the intercommunal talks and to the prospects of an eventual settlement.

Ownership of Property in the North

As noted above, in 1983 the Turkish Cypriot people established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and by Article 159 of its 1985 Constitution they appropriated land for the resettlement of refugees, including the land claimed by Mrs. Loizidou. The majority members of the ECHR considered the government of the TRNC to be illegal because the UN Security Council had said (Resolutions 541& 550) that its establishment was incompatible with the Cyprus international Treaties made in 1960, and called upon member States not to recognise it as a State. They held that the 1985 Constitution had therefore no validity in law, and that the Applicant was still the owner of the land.

They failed however to make any analysis at all of the question whether the TRNC was legal or not. They did not examine the 1960 Treaties, the principles of international law on recognition of States, nor the facts of the 1963-74 period, and based their judgement instead on the two Resolutions of the Security Council - which is not even a judicial body - and on subsequent international resolutions based on them.

Judge Pettiti asked "is it possible in 1996 to represent the views of the "international community" on the question as uncontested, given that the most recent resolutions of the UN go back several years and the court had no knowledge of the missions of the international mediators? For the court it would appear that only Turkey is accountable for the consequences of the 1974 conflict!

Moreover, as also noted above, in purporting to decide a point of law in Resolutions 541 & 550, the Security Council had not proceeded in a manner appropriate to the performance of a judicial function. "The Resolutions were tainted by such a degree of selectivity and incompleteness as to render them arbitrary and discriminatory and thus not well-founded in law. It follows that the call to states not to recognise the TRNC was not legally justified.

If the Security Council had assessed the situation as a whole, it could not possibly have concluded that the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot community violated the controlling legal instruments while the conduct of the Greek Cypriot community did not. Nor could it have reached any other conclusion than that the action of the Greek Cypriot community justified the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot community". (E.Lauterpacht CBE QC (Opinion - UN doc. A/44/968, S/21463 (1990).

In any event "Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution ...cannot be completely set to one side as devoid of all effect merely on the basis of international non-recognition" Judge Baka (Hungary).

Judge Pettiti said "the status and responsibilities of the TRNC should have been examined more fully. It is true that the United Nations has not admitted the TRNC as a member, but the lack of such recognition is no obstacle to the attribution of national and international powers. The case of Taiwan is comparable."

Validity of Government Acts

Whether the TRNC was legal or recognised or not "the court accepted the validity of measures adopted by the TRNC authorities in the fields of civil law, private law, and the registration of births, marriages, and deaths, without specifying reasons for distinguishing between these branches of law and the law concerning the use of property (Judge Pettiti).

Judge Jambrek was of the same opinion. He said "It would be going too far to say that no purportedly legal acts of the TRNC are valid - for example a marriage conducted by a TRNC official would have legal effect outside that jurisdiction. Similarly a transfer of property between private individuals and registered by a TRNC official would have legal effect elsewhere in the world."

The ECHR was referred to the case of Hesperides Hotels v Aegean Turkish Holidays & Müftüzade [1978] QB 205 (noted above) and brushed it aside without reasons. Judge Pettiti commented "The need [for housing] seems obvious, and if events had made the rehousing operation inevitable, that could justify the interference. The facts of the matter had to be looked into."

The European Court of Human Rights failed to examine this question either, saying simply that expropriation without compensation is not acceptable. If they had examined it they would have found that the Turkish Cypriots have always maintained that proper compensation should be paid to all Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who lost their property, as part of an overall settlement between the two communities. If the Greek Cypriot government had wished to compensate their own people in advance they have had tens of millions of dollars in overseas aid with which they could have done so. They choose however to keep the property issue alive for political reasons and to spend their money on armaments (See Greek Cypriot Military Build-up below).

Conclusion

This case reflects no credit on the European Court of Human Rights, and does grave damage to the judicial protection of those rights. It testifies also to the uncanny ability of the Greek Cypriots to extract almost anything they like from international institutions.

Most of the property claims of British and other third party nationals in Northern Cyprus were settled long ago, and the few which remain are likely to be settled soon. Of those third party nationals whose claims are still unresolved, some are unable to prove title because the documents have been lost. Others have no documents of title because they were evading taxes or exchange controls, or were acting as unofficial nominees for Greeks or Greek Cypriots.

Displaced persons or "refugees" are today no more than a political device in Cyprus, as all Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot displaced persons have been resettled. In the case of the Greek Cypriots this has been done with funds supplied from international aid programmes, but little of this aid was given to the Turkish Cypriots.

There are of course people who can technically be regarded as refugees since they have never formally renounced their desire to return to their former homes. This issue is dealt with above.

On 15th December 1996 The Sunday Times wrote: "Most Greek Cypriot refugees appear to reject the idea of monetary compensation... though they must know that there can never be a settlement if they persist in this."

Application for Membership of the European Union

"If there is going to be an application to the EC this must be a joint application of both communities." (Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, US Special Coordinator for Cyprus - Cyprus Times 8th June 1990).

Nevertheless, on 4th July 1990 the Greek Cypriot Administration of Mr. Vassiliou applied for membership, and purported to do so on behalf of Cyprus as a whole. They had no legal or moral right to take this action. Under the 1960 International Agreements, sovereignty was vested jointly in the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and such a fundamental step could not therefore be taken without the authority of the elected leaders of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot co-founders of the Republic. The Turkish Cypriots, having been excluded from the government by force in 1963, were not even consulted.

The UN Secretary General has made it clear that the relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is not one of majority and minority, but of political equals. Even Mr. Vassiliou himself accepted at the Council of Europe, on 30th January 1990, in answer to a question from Sir Keith Speed MP, that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities are political equals, but he ignored that fact in making the EC application.

The Secretary-General has also made it clear (S/24472) that an overall settlement between the two peoples of Cyprus will provide that "matters related to the membership of the federal republic [of Cyprus] in the European [Union] .... will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referendums." No such referendum has of course been held.

The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended in 1987 that "The member governments of the European [Union] should make unequivocally clear to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that no further moves will be made towards the establishment of a customs union between Cyprus and the EC until obstacles to inter-community trade in Cyprus are lifted and the present measures to impose an embargo on third party trade and communications with northern Cyprus are removed."

On 27th April 1994 US President Clinton declared the support of the United States "for the accession of the entire island of Cyprus, as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation to the European Union."

As the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus and its government were founded on the concept of bi-communality, which is enshrined in international treaties, a question of international law arises.

Cyprus membership of the European Union would be illegal, since it would violate Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, by virtue of which the Republic of Cyprus bound itself "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever." It is sometimes argued that the EU is not a state, but when an applicant joins the EU it does not enter into a union with the EU itself, but with each of the member states which constitute the European Union. Clearly if Cyprus were to join the EU she would be participating in both a political and an economic union not only with one State, but with each of the fifteen member states. It is also argued that the purpose of this article was solely to prevent union with Greece or Turkey. The article is not drawn as narrowly as that, and in fact refers to any State whatsoever, but even if it were, Greece is one of those fifteen states.

It is also argued that since members of the EU retain their sovereignty, membership of the EU does not constitute participation in a union within the meaning of the Treaty. This is not however a sustainable argument because the Treaty prohibits union in whole or in part. The treaty also prohibits political or economic union, and cannot therefore be taken to apply only to total political unions.

Further, in the preparatory discussions for the 1960 Agreements, (UK Foreign Office doc. RGC 1073/28) on 12th February 1959 the British Foreign Secretary actually raised the question whether Article 1 was intended to preclude Cypriot membership of international associations. He was told by the Turkish and Greek Foreign Minsters that the paragraph was intended to prohibit ENOSIS either with Greece or any other country, but there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members, nor to membership of the Commonwealth or Sterling Area. The corollary of this of course is that there could be objection to membership of other international associations unless Greece and Turkey were both members.

By Article 2 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the United Kingdom and Greece bound themselves "to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly ... union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State...." They are therefore bound by the 1960 Treaty to exercise their veto power as members of the European Council to prohibit the accession of Cyprus until such time as all parties to that Treaty give their consent. Similarly, the other member States of the EU, and the Institutions of the EU, whilst not themselves parties to the 1960 Treaty would be condoning breaches of international law by Cyprus, Greece, and the United Kingdom if they agreed to the accession of Cyprus.

If Britain were officially to make the argument outlined above, that Article 1 prohibits union with one state but not with fifteen, it would be seen in the world as a country which will not comply with the clear words of its legal obligations, and will instead resort to legal sophistry to avoid them. Worse, in the context of Cyprus, it would undermine respect for treaties, and its own efforts and those of the UN to promote an agreed settlement. How could Britain expect the Turkish Cypriots to rely on international assurances, even in a treaty, if they are going to be told later that the words do not really mean what they say?

The Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee is sometimes compared with the Austrian State Treaty which it is said should likewise have prohibited Austrian membership of the EU. There are many differences between the two treaties, but whether the Austrian Treaty did or did not prohibit EU membership the overriding factor is that Austria joined the EU with the agreement of all parties to their treaty, who thereby waived any potential breach. No such agreement has yet been reached in the case of Cyprus.

Further, as Turkey is not yet a member of the EU, the accession of Cyprus would put Cyprus in breach of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment (Cmnd.1093), which requires it to give Most Favoured Nation Treatment to Turkey as well as to Greece (Annex F Part II). Turkey’s Association Agreement with the EU is not sufficient to meet this legal objection since it does not put Turkey in the same economic position as if it were a member state.

In addition, Article 8 of the Zurich and London international agreements on the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus provides that "the [Greek Cypriot] President and the [Turkish Cypriot] Vice-President separately and conjointly shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs." The Greek Cypriot decision to apply for membership of the EU without the concurrence of the Turkish Cypriots is therefore a further breach of international law.

On 15th August 1996 The Daily Telegraph wrote: The EU tends to be sympathetic to the Greek position, and has allowed Greek Cyprus to apply for membership on behalf of the whole island (a flagrant breach of the Cyprus constitution, which prohibits political or economic union with any other country)......The current unrest is aggravated by the Greek Cypriot application to the EU which, on the proposed terms, would amount to ENOSIS under any other name. Britain should insist that an internal settlement is in place before that application is allowed to proceed."

The continuation of the application is also a breach by the Greek Cypriots of Security Council Resolution 649 (1990) which called upon both sides to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation, and by accepting the application the European Institutions have acted contrary to the spirit of that resolution.

In its Opinion (Com (93) 313) on the Greek Cypriot application, the European Commission has completely ignored Articles 1 and 2 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Annex F of the Treaty of Establishment, and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots under the 1959 Zurich & London Agreements.

Any amendment to or waiver of these treaty obligations would require the consent of the Turkish Cypriots, and of the three Guarantor powers, Britain, Turkey, and Greece. As noted above, on 12th February 1959 the Guarantor powers agreed that they would have no objection to Cyprus joining an international organisation of which both Turkey and Greece were members, but not an organisation, such as the EU, of which one (Turkey) is not a member.

Membership of a political and economic system such as the EU is in any event completely impractical without the concurrence of both peoples of Cyprus, and the application should never have been made. The reality is that there have been two fully functioning democratic governments in Cyprus since the 1960 Constitution broke down in 1963, each exercising jurisdiction in its own part of the island to the exclusion of the other. In these circumstances it would be impossible for Cyprus to implement its commitments under the EU Treaties.

The Turkish Cypriots would welcome membership of the European Union as part of an overall Cyprus settlement within which it would be possible for EU membership to be effectual, but if the Greek Cypriot application were to be accepted without the agreement of the Turkish Cypriots, it is likely that they would feel that they had no alternative but to integrate with Turkey.

The Greek Cypriots often compare the Cyprus situation with the situation in Germany at the time the Federal Republic became a founder-member of the European Communities. The analogy is however false, since the government of the Federal Republic did not claim to be the government of all Germany and did not seek to bind the Government and people of East Germany without their consent.

On 6th June 1995 US Ambassador Ledsky said "the question of membership inside Europe for Cyprus is a divisive issue rather than a unifying one. In the past it has been a source of misunderstanding between the two communities, not a source of understanding" (Turkish Daily News 6.6.95). The application should proceed no further until such time as the two peoples of Cyprus are in a position to make a joint request that it be further considered.

British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, said "without a unified Cyprus, the problems of accession to the European Union will be extremely difficult, and very difficult to realise." (Cyprus Mail 29.11.96).

The European Union must be careful not to give any encouragement to the reckless strategy which the Greek Cypriot President Clerides revealed to "Fileleftheros" on 14th August 1993. He said: "even if Turkey has the right of unilateral military intervention in Cyprus, such a right would not be exercised against a state which is an EU member. The reason for this is that EU countries are tied to one another not only through economic agreements but also military agreements, and they consider a military intervention against a member state as an attack made upon themselves."

On 25th April 1994 he told PIK TV "If it becomes certain that the accession of Cyprus into the Union will be achieved... then Turkey’s intervention in an EU member-country becomes unthinkable.

The Greek Cypriots must not be allowed to delude themselves into thinking that the European Union would act as a shield for them if they were to provoke further violence in Cyprus or pick another fight with Turkey.

Greek Cypriot Military Build-up

In the House of Commons on 30th November 1990, the Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs said that the Greek Cypriots were "pursuing a substantial arms purchasing programme for the Greek Cypriot National Guard. We have made clear our view", he continued, "that such measures do nothing to help create the right climate for resuming the intercommunal talks" This criticism was ignored, and was repeated on 19th April 1991.

Speaking in the US House of Representatives on 17th November 1989 Congressman Burton (Indiana) said "There is no rational reason why the Greek Cypriots have taken this action (ie their military build-up). At a time when peace seems to be breaking out all over the world and at a sensitive period in the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiations this senseless action can only serve to exacerbate the Cyprus dispute."

Security Council Resolution 789 calls upon the Greek Cypriots to reduce their "defence" spending, but they increased it. In recent years [the Greek Cypriots] have gone on an arms-buying spree out of all proportion to their size....They spend about £295 per head on defence, which is just over half that of Israel. (Sunday Times 12.1.97). On 21st March 1996 they signed a Military Technical Cooperation Agreement with Russia, and are buying T-80U main battle tanks, BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers, and advanced ground-to-air missiles. They are also buying Chinese Scud intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Turkish Cypriots cannot understand why the Greek Cypriots are doing this, since no Greek Cypriot (apart from those who have violated the UN Buffer Zone) has been harmed since 1974, and a federal future for Cyprus can only arise from the free will of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; not from coercion or intimidation. Turkish Cypriots have never capitulated to the threat or use of force, and it is most unlikely that Turkey will ever allow them to be overwhelmed, no matter what diplomatic pressures are brought to bear upon the Turkish Government. Feeling is so strong among the Turkish people and among all political parties in Turkey on this point that no Turkish Government could survive if it sought to abandon the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has made it clear that it will not allow the new missiles to be located in Southern Cyprus, and will if necessary impose a naval blockade.

Perhaps the Greek Cypriots wish to start a fight so that they can call on the world to help them when they begin to lose, but no fair minded member of the international community is likely to be a party to such a strategy. There must never again be any attempt to settle disagreements between Turkish and Greek Cypriots by violence.

On 7th February 1995 the distinguished Greek Cypriot academic, Sofronis Sofroniou, wrote in the Cyprus Mail "The so-called unitary defence doctrine has become the springboard for chauvinistic attitudes and, what is worse, for a false sense of security and for throwing caution to the wind. .... The internal political scene is allowed to drift to the most uncompromising and surreal stances. We seem to be back to the puerile time of the Greek Colonels, the time of Hellenic Christian fundamentalism."

The British Government

Whilst not recognising the Turkish Cypriot State, the British Government has sought to maintain good practical relations with the Turkish Cypriots, and in January 1987 the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office issued a memorandum (CPS/25), paragraph 26 of which stated that:

"Our non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not affect our acknowledgement of the interests and aspirations of the Turkish Cypriot community. We maintain a dialogue with their leaders through our High Commissioner in Nicosia. We continue to trade with them and we try to see that they benefit from the aid we give to Cyprus."

Although the Turkish Cypriot leader, President Denkta?, meets regularly with the UN Secretary General, and has also had talks with the US Secretary of State, British Ministers would not talk with him and they expected him to communicate via officials. They do however meet frequently with the Greek Cypriot leader. They would always say that a meeting with President Denkta? "would not be helpful at the present time," but this policy was severely criticised by many senior British Members of Parliament as being contrary to the principles of natural justice. One of those principles is that both sides of the case must always be given an equal hearing.

In July 1994 the following motion was tabled in the House of Commons, and signed by 20 Members of the United Kingdom parliament:

"This House notes that twenty years ago Turkey intervened in Cyprus in accordance with international law; deplores the racist behaviour of the Greek Cypriots during the previous eleven years when they murdered hundreds of Turkish Cypriot men, women and children, and reduced the Turkish Cypriot population to near starvation; deplores the invasion of Cyprus by Greek troops on 15th July 1974; and trusts that Turkey will maintain troops there for so long as necessary to prevent any recurrence of such behaviour; welcomes the acceptance by President Denkta? of the UN Confidence Building Measures on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, and condemns the Greek Cypriot leader for threatening resignation if verbal assurances given by the United Nations to the Turkish Cypriots are put in writing, thereby making it impossible for further progress to be made; and calls upon the Prime Minister to invite President Denkta? to London for talks, and to make the following Downing Street Declaration:

"It would be wrong to attempt to impose, or to persuade others to impose, a united Cyprus in the absence of the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Cyprus. The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Cyprus as a whole, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, north and south, to bring about a united Cyprus, if that is their wish. The British Government will encourage, facilitate and enable, all the people living in Cyprus to achieve agreement - not agreement of a particular character but simply agreement, through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on full respect for the identities and equal political rights of both the peoples of the island."

This is in exactly the same terms as the Downing Street Declaration for Northern Ireland.

A welcome development has been the visit by British Foreign Secretary Rifkind to Northern Cyprus on 16th December 1996 and his meeting there with President Denkta?. The new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, also met President Denkta? whilst shadow foreign secretary. The Prime Minister and the US President should also meet President Denkta? without further delay.

The Commonwealth

When Cyprus joined the Commonwealth shortly after independence its Turkish Cypriot people, no less than its Greek Cypriot people, became Commonwealth citizens. However, when the Greek Cypriots usurped authority in 1963 the Turkish Cypriots were effectively frozen out of all the affairs of the Commonwealth. Since then all representatives at Commonwealth meetings have been Greek Cypriots, and the Commonwealth Secretary General (unlike the UN Secretary General) will not even speak to the elected Turkish Cypriot leaders. Even when they broke free from Greek Cypriot domination still the Commonwealth ignored them.

The Turkish Cypriots feel justifiably aggrieved by the attitude of the Commonwealth toward them, and the Commonwealth should change its policy forthwith. If the British Foreign Secretary and the UN Secretary-General can meet President Denkta?, then so can the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.

Aid

Greek Cyprus must rank as one of the most subsidised countries in the world. It has for many years received massive infusions of aid from international organisations, and in 1995 the EU agreed to provide up to a further 74 million ECU. In addition it receives bilateral aid from Britain and other countries, and benefits financially from the UN military presence and the British bases. It has a population of only half a million people, and according to the European Commission (Com (93) 313) it had in 1991 a GDP per inhabitant of about ECU 9,000 per annum, which is higher than in several member states of the Community itself, and is three times greater than the North.

The Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded in 1987 that: "the disparity between aid provision and need in the two parts of Cyprus is self-evident. By most criteria the southern sector of Cyprus, with a relatively high GNP , is no longer eligible for economic aid at all" and recommended that: "The UK Government should review its own aid programme for Cyprus, with a view to ensuring that economic and development aid benefits those who are most in need. " - namely the Turkish Cypriots. Very little has been done to implement this recommendation, and still most of the aid goes to the Greek Cypriots.

So far as the European Community is concerned, the President of the EC Council declared on 19th October 1987: "I would recall the constant position of the Community that the advantages provided for by our agreements would apply for the benefit of the whole population of the island of Cyprus." Whilst lip-service is paid to this principle, most of the international aid goes to the Greek Cypriot "Government of Cyprus" which, in pursuit of its declared policy to ruin the Turkish Cypriot economy, does everything it can to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots benefit as little as possible. In future, all aid for Cyprus should be given to the UN for use in the North.

One of the largest aid projects - the Nicosia sewage system - did benefit the Turkish Cypriots, but it is highly doubtful that it would have done so if the Greek Cypriots could physically have built it without Turkish Cypriot cooperation.

One consequence of the foreign aid which the Greek Cypriots have received is their ability to buy armaments on a massive scale, as noted above.

Antiquities

Northern Cyprus is the site of many antiquities of world importance, and the Turkish Cypriots accept their responsibility to preserve them. They face enormous difficulties because, as noted above, they receive very little of the international aid given to Cyprus, and their economy is held back by the Greek Cypriot inspired trade embargo. Further, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots have succeeded in dissuading international archaeologists and other experts from working in the North. One British archaeologist who has not been deterred is Viscountess Hanworth. In her view "failure to help Northern Cyprus would be an offence against posterity."

The Turkish Cypriots have however managed to preserve many Christian churches which are no longer needed for religious purposes, including the important monastery of St. Barnabas, and the churches of St. Mamas in Morphou, Archangelos Michael in Kyrenia, Panagia Theotokos in Trikomo, and St. John of Mara_ in Varosha. In these churches an important collection of Christian ikons is preserved for scholarship. They are also conserving many important buildings from the Ottoman period, including the Dervi_ Pa_a Mansion in north Nicosia.

In the South a large number of mosques and other sites of religious importance to the Turkish Cypriots have been destroyed, the most recent being the historic Ömeriye mosque destroyed on 12th August 1996. The Bayraktar Mosque and the Araplar Mosque in the South were attacked in March 1994, and there have been many others.

Items of religious or artistic importance have been stolen from both Northern and Southern Cyprus, including a whole mural painting which ingenious thieves removed from a small disused church in a rural part of Northern Cyprus. When President Denkta? was told about this he paid out of his own pocket for reinforced doors to prevent further thefts.

On 20th September 1991 the Cyprus Mail wrote that "The flow of antiquities from (South) Cyprus is turning into a scandal." and on 18th September 1996 the same newspaper reported that "almost 9,000 ancient artifacts were exported legally from (Southern Cyprus) between 1969 and 1991."

XII WESTERN INTERESTS

The West must of course have regard to its own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in relation to Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East. It is however remarkable how far American, and to a lesser degree British, policy is conditioned not by the real foreign policy interests but by well financed political influence and lobbying by Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and Greek-Americans in Washington and London. On the Cyprus issue, international policy is driven essentially from those two capitals.

Western policy towards Cyprus is damaging relations with Turkey, as well as with the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey is tired of Cyprus being used against it, quite unjustifiably, in almost every international forum. It is wrong that the Greeks have made Cyprus an issue in relation to Turkey's application to join the European Union. Turkey complied in 1974 with its legal obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee and is being penalised for doing so. Greece violated that Treaty in a gross and obvious manner, and now purports to sit in judgment.

Turkey is a nation of 62 million people with huge economic potential whereas Greece is a country with only 10 million people and relatively little undeveloped potential. The European Commission is of the opinion (Com (93) 313) that Turkey "is of major strategic, political, and economic importance to the [Union]."

Turkey is strategically vital to the whole Western world, and Turkish help in the provision of air bases and in closing the oil pipeline from Iraq was crucial to the success of the Gulf War. Turkish help was also vital to the creation of a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds. The losses suffered from closure of the oil pipeline have been enormous, and have done serious economic damage to the Turkish economy; particularly to the economy of its South Eastern region. Turkey is also vital to Western interests in the Turkiç speaking region of the former USSR. Further, whilst democracy is now well established in Turkey, it still needs to be nurtured. It is essential that good relations are maintained.

British bases and other installations in Cyprus do not make Britain and America as vulnerable to Greek Cypriot political pressure as might be thought, because:

* aircraft have a much longer range there is not the same need for runways as existed in the 1960's

* the main value to NATO of Cyprus today is for electronic surveillance. It would be costly and inconvenient to relocate the equipment, but it could be relocated in the North, or in Turkey.

* the bases provide employment for 3,500 Greek Cypriot workers

* the bases contribute more than £59m per year to the Greek Cypriot economy

* the military security to which they contribute benefits not only the British but all the people of the region, including the Greek Cypriots.

* Cyprus, whilst useful as an air force training area, is not indispensable.

XIII RECOGNITION

Recognition of States

It is said that the whole world, except Turkey, does not recognise the Turkish Cypriot state, as if that were an end to the matter. In fact, knowing little and caring less about Cyprus, most members of the United Nations have taken the lead of Britain and the US, who persuaded the Security Council to pass Resolution 541. This called upon states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than (the by then defunct) "Republic of Cyprus". In fact Bangladesh did recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but when threatened with the withdrawal of US aid they withdrew recognition. Pakistan expressed its willingness to recognise, but was similarly threatened.

International law defines a State as a territory with defined boundaries, with a government to which the inhabitants are habitually obedient, and which is free from political control by any other State. (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht - Recognition in International Law paras. 10 - 13).

There is no doubt that Northern Cyprus has clearly defined boundaries, and it was decided in the "Hesperides Hotels" case noted above, that it has a government which makes laws to which the inhabitants are habitually obedient.

So far as political control is concerned Northern Cyprus is treated by Turkey as an independent state, and whilst there are close links between the two countries the Turkish Government does not claim any right to interfere in the political affairs of Northern Cyprus. There have in the history of the United Nations been many member states subject to enormous political influence by other states, notably in Eastern Europe, but they were nevertheless recognised at the United Nations as independent states.

It is sometimes argued that economic and military viability are preconditions of statehood. However, if it were not for international discrimination against Northern Cyprus it could easily support its population, and if it were not for Greek and Greek Cypriot aggression they would never have needed Turkish troops. Are the aggressors to be rewarded by denying statehood to their victim? In any event, if economic or military viability were indeed conditions of statehood many member states of the UN would fail to qualify. Some of them have an even smaller population than Northern Cyprus.

The practice of recognition in international law is an uneasy mixture of law and politics. Recognition, and even membership of the United Nations has been granted where the legal conditions of independent statehood do not exist eg Ukraine when part of the USSR; and has been witheld where those conditions do exist eg. Taiwan, Northern Cyprus. The decision is essentially political and should not be invested with the authority of law.

The argument which is usually deployed against British recognition of Northern Cyprus runs as follows. Britain is a party to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Article 2 of which provides that Britain will recognise and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and that Britain will prohibit, insofar as it concerns her, any activity aimed at promoting directly or indirectly union with any other state, or partition.

It is therefore argued that if Britain were to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus she would be failing to recognise the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and would be failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting partition.

The reality is however that the territorial integrity of the Republic was destroyed by the Greek Cypriots in 1963 when they divided the island. Britain failed to guarantee it when it could and should have done, and there is no longer any territorial integrity capable of recognition or guarantee. So far as independence is concerned, the "Republic of Cyprus" whose independence was to be recognised and guaranteed was, according to the Preamble to the Treaty itself the Republic as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

That Republic was also destroyed by the Greek Cypriots in 1963, and its Constitution declared by Makarios in Athens on 1st February 1966 to be abrogated, and buried."

It is surprising that these legal arguments should even be made by Greece which, for most of the period from 1960 to 1974, had itself ignored the treaty by failing to respect the independence of Cyprus, and by not only failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting union with itself but by actually engaging in it; and by a Greek Cypriot community which from 1963 to 1974 had failed fundamentally to maintain respect for the constitution of the Republic, or the international treaties on which the constitution was based, as evidenced by its treatment of its Turkish Cypriot fellow-citizens and partners.

In its Namibia Advisory Opinion (ICJ Reports 1971 p.46) the International Court of Justice at the Hague held that a party which disowns or does not fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognised as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship.

So far as partition is concerned, the Turkish Cypriots have always made it clear in negotiations and by formal declaration in 1975 and 1983 that they were seeking not partition but a single bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal Republic. It is in fact the Greek Cypriot unilateral application to the EU which is most likely to lead to partition, as noted above.

Acceptance of Governments

Although the 1960 Constitution has been destroyed, Britain is still bound by Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee to guarantee the state of affairs established by the basic articles of that constitution. Accordingly, acceptance by Britain of the Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of all Cyprus is a breach of its obligation under Article 2. That state of affairs was one in which the Turkish Cypriots were entitled to participate in all the decision-making processes of government and to exercise veto powers in clearly defined circumstances.

For Britain to deal with officials in whose appointment Turkish Cypriots have been denied their constitutional role, and for Britain to recognise as the acts of a "Government of Cyprus" decisions in which Turkish Cypriots have had no part, is not only a failure to recognise and guarantee, but is actually to assist, the continued violation of the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution.

As there is no legal basis on which the Greek Cypriots can claim jurisdiction over the whole of Cyprus, there are important practical consequences. For example the "Cyprus Air Transport Licensing Authority" consists entirely of Greek Cypriot officials, in whose appointment the Turkish Cypriots had no say and over whom they were deprived of such authority as would have been their right under the 1960 Constitution. That licensing authority can therefore have no lawful jurisdiction over the whole of Cyprus, and governments of other countries and ICAO are wrong to regard its consent as a condition for air services to Northern Cyprus.

XIV CONCLUSION

The Turkish Cypriot people are justified in feeling aggrieved by the treatment which they have received, not only from the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, but from the world at their behest. Having accepted proposals which both the Secretary- General and the British Government considered a reasonable basis for settlement, and having continued to talk since 1968 - always being urged to have "just one more try" - they are entitled to expect that their condition of political limbo will soon be at an end.

The British and US Governments say on frequent occasions that they do not accept the obvious reality that the two peoples of Cyprus have had for many years a separate existence, each under their own elected government, because to do so would be "to cement the division of Cyprus". Their present policy is however having precisely that effect. The advantages which the Greek Cypriots enjoy by virtue of their unjustified recognition as the Government of Cyprus" are valuable to them, and they will not relinquish them except at a very high price. That price will in all probability be too high for any Turkish Cypriot leader to pay without jeopardising the security or economic future of his people.

The Greek Cypriots say that the power and influence which flows from international recognition is the only weapon they have against the Turkish army; the assumption being that they have some legal or moral right to have that weapon. As has been seen, they have no legal right to be treated as the government of all Cyprus, nor having regard to their appalling behaviour do they have any moral right. By contrast, the Turkish army has a legal right to be in Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriots, by reason of their suffering at the hands of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, have a moral as well as a legal right to its protection.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a political fact, and it is not in the long term interests of Britain nor of the European Union to continue any longer to discriminate against it. As a precursor to a settlement all restrictions on flights to, and trade and communications with, Northern Cyprus should be removed forthwith, and international aid to Cyprus should in future be allocated on the basis of need.

At a time when so much in the world is changing it is absurd to continue to deal with Cyprus on the basis of a thirty three year old fiction. Everyone hopes that international efforts will succeed, but a settlement which either party finds unacceptable will be no settlement at all, and could plunge Cyprus again into violence and bloodshed. A settlement at any price would be worse than international acceptance of the present reality in Cyprus.

It is said that apart from the legal and moral rights of each of the parties, the present state of affairs is unacceptable because of the border violations and the threat by the Greek Cypriots to install missiles in Cyprus. The international community is however in a position to deal with these issues, and as noted above, they will not be solved by imposing an overall settlement unacceptable to one or both. The international community should make it clear to both sides that they must not permit incursions into the UN buffer zone, and must not station missiles in Cyprus. Any party which does so could then expect to suffer diplomatic, economic, or other penalties.

"It is very difficult to arrive at a federal formula, or even a confederated one, because unification means psychological commitment to emotional solidarity, which does not exist." (Dr. Hugo Gobbi Rethinking Cyprus Tel Aviv 1993 p.76).

One side wishes to re-establish its domination over the other, and has internationalised the matter because it believes that the international community will assist it to move step by step toward this objective. The other side is determined that it will never submit, and if any form of coercion is used against it the result will be immense damage to international relations in the area, and even in another war.

The United Nations can help for the foreseeable future by maintaining the peacekeeping force with orders to prevent any further provocation on the border, by removing Cyprus from its political agenda, and by using its best endeavours to ensure that the leaders of the two communities are treated as equals. The UN must also warn against any attempt to change the status quo by force of arms, and should facilitate the payment of compensation now to all on both sides who lost their property.

The world should recognise both of the States of Cyprus, and in due course it is more than likely that the two peoples, dealing with each other as equals, and on the basis of mutual respect, would wish to build a closer association between themselves, just as the sovereign peoples of Europe have done. The Security Council should rescind the ill-advised and legally incorrect declaration which it made in Resolutions 541 and 550. This would lay the foundations for dealings between the two communities on the basis of mutual respect and political equality, without which a future political association between them is very unlikely.

The UN Secretary-General (S/24472) thinks that "the international community has the right to expect that talks [between the two leaders] will result in an agreement." The international community may justifiably hope for such an outcome, but it has no such right. The two leaders are responsible to the two peoples of Cyprus and to no-one else, for it is those people who will die, and whose homes and businesses will be destroyed, if one or both are forced by the international community into a settlement which will not work.

In "My Vision For Cyprus", published in 1988 President Rauf Denkta? said:

"My vision for Cyprus is one in which my grandchildren can grow up in peace and free from fear. This may not seem much to ask, but my generation of Turkish Cypriots and that of my children have suffered so much that we can never again take the future for granted or place our trust in pieces of paper. Our future must therefore be one in which we can live our lives in peace, and can retain our national identity, culture and traditions."